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WORKING PAPER

**CONFERENCE ON MILITARIZATION
IN THE THIRD WORLD**

January 1987

Papers by: Paul Rogers
Michael Klare
Dan O'Meara

INSTITUT CANADIEN POUR LA PAIX ET
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PREFACE

A Conference on Militarization in the Third World was convened by the Programme of Studies in National and International Development at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, in January 1987. The object of this meeting was to bring together specialists in security and peace studies and development studies--fields of research not normally close to each other--so that they might collaborate in assessing the causes of militarization in the Third World and its implications for the future. The meeting was attended by some forty specialists in these two fields and a further forty scholars, policy makers, journalists, educators and others.

The three papers by Paul Rogers, Michael Klare and Dan O'Meara have been chosen for publication, out of the fourteen presented, because they represent the major themes of the conference and indicate the urgent need for further research in this area. Both the papers and the accompanying introduction by Colin Leys and Robert Malcolmson should be of considerable interest to those specialists who wish to keep the situation under review.

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INTRODUCTION

Colin Leys and Robert Malcolmson

Since the late 1960s there has been a dramatic increase in the level of spending on military personnel and armaments in the Third World and a growing tendency to seek military solutions to political conflicts. This has been especially clear in the Middle East, Africa and Central America, although the trend is almost universal. In 1987 the Center for Defense Information identified forty conflicts in progress around the globe, involving a quarter of the world's nations, largely in the Third World. The consequences for the often fragile economies of these countries and for their human populations have been very serious, and in some cases disastrous. In Ethiopia, alone, an estimated 750,000 people died in the drought of 1983-85, a large part of them in the north-east region of the country where the war between the government in Addis Ababa and the forces fighting for independence in Eritrea and Tigre, which had already caused immeasurable human suffering, seriously impeded effective relief measures. The accumulating social costs of the military conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Chad, Iran and Iraq, Lebanon, Mozambique and Nicaragua (to name only some of the best known) are increasingly appalling. By 1987 the Iran-Iraq war was estimated to have cost over a million killed and wounded, losses that already exceed by a wide margin those of Britain and the Commonwealth during the whole of World War II.

These, however, are not the only costs involved. A more adequate accounting of the impact of militarization on the Third World must also reckon with the economic and political costs that have been incurred even in areas where military conflicts have not broken out. The budgetary and foreign exchange costs are often crippling, to the point where, in some cases, national economies have been virtually bankrupted

(for instance, in Mozambique and Nicaragua) and whole populations have suffered a catastrophic decline in living standards, with growing malnutrition and rising levels of morbidity and mortality among hundreds of thousands of people. As military budgets have grown, the budgets for health and education and other welfare provisions have, as a rule, either been reduced or given lower priority. An adequate accounting must also reckon with the domestic political consequences of militarization. In 1987 more than half of the sub-Saharan African countries were ruled directly or indirectly by their armies, as were a significant number of countries in South and South-East Asia. In these nations there were few political liberties and an often scant regard for elementary human rights. In Latin America, despite the "recivilianisation" of many governments since 1978, severe constraints on democracy are imposed by the continuing political power of the military in domestic affairs.

Current problems in the Third World are, moreover, almost certain to be complicated and exacerbated by the relentless "modernization" of military hardware. Chemical weapons have been used in the Iran-Iraq war, and they are likely to be of increasing importance in the arsenals of numerous Third World states. Conventional weapons, which are becoming more complex, more expensive, and more lethal, ensure that battlefields will be even deadlier places than before and, if the past forty years are any guide, most of these battlefields will be in underdeveloped countries. Although Lebanon, less than a generation ago, would not have been considered an especially backward country, its history in recent years is certainly stark testimony to the brutal impact of sustained conventional warfare in an age of advanced military science. The suppliers of this hardware are now increasingly varied and display few scruples about those to whom they sell. Wars in the Third World are often highly profitable to the arms

producers: China, well attuned to these advantages, has become a leading supplier of weaponry to both Iran and Iraq. As for the prospect of nuclear proliferation, we can now point to the existence of four "undeclared" nuclear weapons states-- that is, states that already have a small nuclear arsenal or could have one on short notice. These are Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa. All, of course, are in the Third World and/or deeply implicated in bitter regional disputes. Many observers have already foreseen some of the ways in which such disputes (often inflamed by arms buildups) could suck the Superpowers into a direct confrontation, more or less against their wills, and thus quickly transform a bloody and merciless conventional war into a global catastrophe.

To assess the direction and implications of militarization in the Third World, and to examine its causes, calls for collaboration between specialists in fields of research that have not normally been close to each other: security and peace studies, and development studies. To bring this about was the aim of the Conference on Militarization in the Third World, convened by the Programme of Studies in National and International Development at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, in January 1987; it was attended by some forty specialists in these two fields, and a further forty scholars, policy-makers, journalists, educators and others. Of the fourteen papers presented, three have been chosen for publication here, to represent the major themes of the conference and to indicate the urgent need for further research.

The first major theme was the role played by the relations between the Superpowers in the militarization of the Third World. The advent of the 'second cold war' has been an important factor, to the extent that in Central America, Southern Africa, the Horn, and South and South-East Asia the

Superpowers have initiated military action, primarily through proxies, in pursuit of their interests as they see them. Militarization has also been a direct result of the efforts of the Superpowers, and especially the United States, to acquire the technical capacity to use the threat of military action to pursue their interests anywhere in the world. The enlarged programmes of military aid from the Superpowers to their Third World allies have mostly had these same objectives.

This theme is represented here in the papers by Paul Rogers and Michael Klare. Rogers shows how the United States, in particular, has enormously expanded its ability to intervene directly throughout the Third World during the past six years, deploying highly mobile conventional forces on a scale unmatched by any other power (or even, in some respects, all other powers combined). The United States is also developing a new generation of 'smart' missiles capable of inflicting great destruction with considerable precision on Third World targets without directly endangering American lives. The US technical ability to intervene directly with military forces in the Third World has thus been greatly enhanced, as has the military strength of many of its Third World allies. The political constraints on the use of this firepower are, of course, real, if highly problematic; as Paul Rogers argued at the conference, they need to be studied urgently.

Michael Klare's paper documents the scale of arms acquisition by Third World countries since the early 1970s, two-thirds of it supplied by the two superpowers. He shows that the decline in the total value of such sales reflects in part a switch away from the purchases of highly sophisticated weaponry during the late 1970s and back to simpler and cheaper, if no less lethal, equipment. He shows, too, how the pattern of supply has been shifting away from the two

superpowers in favour not only of other industrial countries, but also of an increasing number of Third World arms exporters. The result of these and other changes seems to be that lower total spending has not reduced the pressure towards militarization resulting from the arms trade but has, if anything, made it more pervasive and harder to control.

The second major theme of the conference was the way in which pressures towards militarization in the Third World that emanate primarily from superpower rivalry, intersect with and reinforce regional tendencies towards militarization, with severe developmental consequences. Here there is a particularly clear need for further research which will take into account the whole complex of forces at work -- inter-state conflicts, internal class, racial and other conflicts, liberation struggles, armies as political institutions, and popular mobilisations in response to foreign interventions-- as well as the global military policies of the Superpowers and their major allies. The conference chose to focus on two regions from this point of view - Central America and the Caribbean, and Southern Africa.

For the present publication, one paper, by Dan O'Meara, has been chosen to illustrate this theme. O'Meara shows how, since 1960, the Republic of South Africa, with the tacit support of the United States since 1980, has pursued an increasingly 'total' military response to what it has defined as the 'total threat' posed by the struggle to end apartheid, including the efforts of neighbouring states to reduce their economic dependence on the Republic. So far, O'Meara points out, South Africa has attained most of its objectives, at an enormous cost in lives and in the living standards of the neighbouring populations (not to mention the ruin of the development strategies aimed at by Mozambique and Angola). It also seems willing to use force to try to destroy the two

latest initiatives of the member states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference: the project to develop the Beira corridor as an alternative to their dependence on South African trade routes, and the drive to secure private foreign investment. The case of Lesotho, where a South African-backed military coup took place in 1986, suggests, as well, that the Republic is also disposed to use force to try to impose more pliable regimes on its weaker neighbours. This phase of Southern African development has the potential to convert the whole region into a war zone, with the risk of escalation through the involvement of external powers.

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The three papers between them make an undeniably strong case for bringing together the usually separate streams of research which they represent. Yet it is also obvious that juxtaposing these lines of work is only a first step, however important, in making intelligible the complex processes at work. It is hoped that the publication of these papers will, like the conference itself, help to stimulate further work which can provide a more adequate theoretical and empirical understanding of the militarization process in the Third World and foster practical initiatives to arrest and reverse it.

FORCE PROJECTION AND THIRD WORLD MILITARIZATION

Paul Rogers

Introduction

The 1980s have seen a marked growth in the defence budgets of several major states, among them the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Much of the public and academic attention which this military expansion attracts has concentrated on the nuclear dimension. This is not without reason, especially in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, since the relatively low level of expansion in the late 1970s has been replaced with a quite remarkable qualitative and quantitative improvement in strategic, intermediate and tactical nuclear weapons.

At the strategic level, for example, it is appropriate to note that, for the first time in forty years, the United States and the Soviet Union are simultaneously expanding all three legs of their strategic triads of ICBMs, bombers and SLBMs. This kind of expansion, involving a net increase of 10,000 strategic warheads in the last nine years alone, is mirrored at the intermediate and tactical levels by such weapons as the Pershing 2, SS-20 and the neutron weapons, and is, together with cold war tensions, largely responsible for the emergence of peace movements in many countries. The weapons and strategies behind this development certainly do warrant immediate analysis, and make the requirements for arms control and disarmament that much more urgent.

Nonetheless, developments in the nuclear field do not constitute the only major military phenomena of the late 1980s which should be of concern to peace and conflict researchers. There has, in addition, been a remarkable and largely unrecognised enhancement in the past few years in the ability to project conventional forces, especially on the part of the

United States. This increase arises primarily from the perceived need to control the "violent peace" of the 1980s and occurs in a context that owes as much to North-South as to East-West relations.

The early post-colonial period co-incided with the rise to world power of the United States. By the end of the 1960s, countries such as Britain and France retained considerable military forces in many parts of the world, yet they were in retreat from world power status. The United States, with its increasingly global military presence, took over this role, which came to include military force projection, training, and arms transfers and was motivated primarily by the policy of containing Soviet power.

The Vietnam War was a protracted and traumatic set-back to this power status, and was followed by the Carter years in which military aspects of implementing foreign policy received relatively less support than they had previously. This was a brief interlude, however, and before the end of the Carter Administration the defence budget was rising. Afghanistan, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the election of Reagan to the Presidency combined to create a near consensus on the need to accord the defence budget a high priority; the re-arming process of the early 1980s was linked to a much more active and aggressive foreign policy.

Prior to this, the mid and late 1970s were years of an increasing recognition of the importance of resource supplies to the United States economy; this added a third factor to the two key foreign policy determinants of Soviet containment and economic influence.

Recognition of this new factor had come to the fore in the events following the Yom Kippur/Ramadan war of October

1973. In the closing stages of that war, the Arab members of OPEC had successfully instituted considerable price increases for crude oil, coupled with a 15 per cent production cut-back and an embargo on exports to the United States and the Netherlands, because of the latter countries' support for Israel during the conflict.

The impact of these decisions was immediate and considerable, but negotiations between producers and consumers failed to rationalise the situation to the satisfaction of the consumers; several months of further rapid price rises and somewhat chaotic attempts at negotiation ensued.

During this period, the use of military force to secure Western oil supplies was considered, but it became apparent that, even if such a move were politically feasible, it would be militarily impossible. The central problem was that the Western nations in general, and the United States in particular, did not have forces at their disposal which could be deployed sufficiently quickly to make the take-over of key Middle East oil fields a viable proposition. The time necessary to achieve such an objective was far greater than the time required to render the oil fields inoperable by sabotage, and the several months required for re-instatement would have been catastrophic for oil supplies to the West.

An immediate outcome of this experience was a re-assessment of military strategy towards resource supplies which became part of a much larger process of analysis. This occurred in the context of an increasing recognition of the steady shift in the "resource balance" in favour of the non-industrialised countries.

Europe had experienced such a shift long ago. In the 19th century, for example, Britain had been a major producer

of metals such as copper, lead and tin from its own mineral reserves. These had long since come close to depletion and by the mid-twentieth century Britain, like most of western Europe, was dependent on overseas supplies. For the resource-rich United States, however, it was a much more recent phenomenon and was only recognised as important by military and foreign policy analysts after 1974. Consequently, within a few years, maintenance of the resource base of the United States had come to be considered a major objective of military strategy. This was expressed most fully in the Military Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1982:

> "The dependency of the United States on foreign sources of non-fuels, minerals and metals has increased sharply over the last two decades. Taking a list of the top 25 such imported commodities, in 1960 our dependency averaged 54 percent. In 1980, our dependency for the same items averages 70 percent. In fact, our dependency is 75 percent or more on foreign countries where war could, in the foreseeable future, deny us our supplies of bauxite, chromite, cobalt, columbium, manganese, nickel and tantalum. These metals and minerals figure in the manufacture of aircraft, motor vehicles, appliances, high strength or stainless steels, magnets, jet engine parts, cryogenic devices, gyroscopes, superconductors, capacitors, vacuum tubes, electro-optics, printed circuits, contacts, connectors, armor plate and instrumentation, among other things."[1]

After giving a detailed account of the importance of Middle East oil supplies, the Posture Statement stresses the Soviet position of near self-sufficiency of resource supplies

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[1] Fiscal Year 1982 Military Posture Statement, US Department of Defense, 1981.

in comparison with US vulnerability, and elaborates on this by making the connection between that vulnerability and Soviet expansionism:

> "The Soviet Union's self-sufficiency in fossil fuels-oil, natural gas and coal - is mirrored by virtual self-sufficiency in other minerals. The Soviet Union must import only six minerals critical to its defense industry, and only two of these are brought in for as much as 50 percent of the requirements. In contrast, the United States relies on foreign sources to supply amounts in excess of 50 percent of its need for some 32 minerals essential for our military and industrial base. Particularly important mineral imports (for example, diamonds, cobalt, platinum, chromium and manganese) come from southern Africa, where the Soviet Union and its surrogates have established substantial influence, and where US access, given the inherent instabilities within the region, is by no means assured."[2]

This emphasis on security of resource supplies had developed by the earliest years of the Reagan Administration, and, while primarily concerned with third world resources, it was clearly seen in an East-West context. The Soviet Union and its perceived surrogates were seen as constituting the ultimate problem for American interests.

To meet this challenge the United States has developed strong military capabilities devoted to force projection. This has been on an altogether larger scale than the "gun-boat diplomacy" of colonial days, partly because these developments in force projection are concerned with adversaries who may themselves be militarily competent, and also because the

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[2] Ibid.

ultimate foe is a military super-power. Indeed, the greatly increased attention given to force projection has the twin aims of safeguarding US interests in non-Soviet regions and of being available for use against Soviet forces in a major East-West conflict.

Nor should the phenomenon of force projection be seen as exclusively a United States development. While primarily regional, Soviet developments are starting to become significant on a global scale, especially in the form of a build-up of some overseas bases. Furthermore, ex-colonial powers such as Britain and France have recently chosen to enhance their force projection capabilities.

This paper contends that the evolution of superpower force projection capabilities is an essential aspect of any study of Third World militarization. Indeed, it provides the military foundation for interventionist foreign policies, at a time when the latent economic and strategic power of the Third World's resource base is coming to be recognised as a key aspect of North-South relations.

US Force Projection - Controlling the "Violent Peace"

Controlling the violent peace of the late 1980s is primarily the responsibility of the US Navy, and as this represents by far the world's largest instrument for projecting conventional military force overseas, it is appropriate to summarise the Navy's strategy. Broadly speaking, it is a strategy which combines the ability to wage direct war with the Soviet Union, should that come to pass, with the ability to confront and resolve a variety of Third World crises and confrontations.

In the ultimate eventuality - war with the Soviet Union- it is assumed that if deterrence breaks down, there will be

three broad stages of confrontation short of nuclear exchange: transition to war, comprising mobilisation and forward deployment of forces; seizing the initiative, including initial attacks on Soviet strategic ballistic missile submarines, "bottling up" of the Soviet naval forces, and preservation of the lines of communication; and, carrying the war to the enemy or favourable war execution and termination.

The final phase has recently been described succinctly by Admiral James D. Watkins:

> "The tasks in this phase are similar to those in earlier phases, but must be more aggressively applied as we seek war termination on terms favourable to the United States and its allies. Our goal would be to complete the destruction of all the Soviet fleets begun in Phase II. This destruction allows us to threaten the bases and support structure of the Soviet navy in all theaters with both air and amphibious power. Such threats are quite credible to the Soviets. At the same time, anti-submarine warfare forces would continue to destroy Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor."[3]

> "During this final phase the United States and its allies would press home the initiative world-wide, while continuing to support air and land campaigns, maintaining sealift, and keeping sea lines of communication open. Amphibious forces, up to the size of a full Marine Amphibious Force, would be used to regain territory. In addition, the full weight of the carrier battle forces

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[3] Watkins, Admiral James D., The Maritime Strategy, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute Supplement, January 1986.

could continue to "roll up" the Soviets on the flanks, contribute to the battle on the Central Front, or carry the war to the Soviets. These tough operations, close to the Soviet motherland, could even come earlier than the last phase."[4]

Thus the expansion of US military forces in the early 1980s has improved their capacity to execute this strategy for war with the Soviet Union, a very heavily armed super-power, but much of this improvement can equally be applied to other conflicts or to proxy conflicts with perceived Soviet surrogates. Indeed, surface combatants, especially carrier battle groups and amphibious forces, are crucial to a strategy for controlling the violent peace in the Third World when this threatens US interests. Such a strategy, according to Harris and Benkert, differs from the kind of global war strategy described by Watkins, in three broad ways.

First, a wartime strategy concentrates on countering overt Soviet aggression while "peacetime strategy objectives are more diffuse and perhaps best characterized as furthering an ill-defined set of interests of which countering the Soviets is only part, although a very important part."[5] Second, a violent peace strategy is inherently less structured and clear-cut in its objectives and processes. Finally, political and diplomatic considerations may dominate or circumscribe military considerations, at least in the early stages of a particular crisis. Within this context, the major aims of a violent peace strategy are: protecting sea lines of communication and transit rights; allowing the United States

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Harris, Commander R. Robinson, and Benkert, Lieutenant Commander Joseph, Is That All There Is?, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, October 1985.

continued access to resources and markets; and, demonstrating US interests overseas.[6]

The Recent Historical Context

Force projection developed rapidly during the Second World War and many of the capabilities involved were available for use in Korea. The Vietnam War included elements of force projection but developed into a semi-permanent overseas war. It is probably true to say that force projection capabilities declined somewhat in the 1970s, especially after the withdrawal from Vietnam, but have markedly increased in the 1980s.

These capabilities may be measured in terms of both enhancement and enlargement; the former includes not just qualitative improvements in ships, aircraft and logistic support but also the level of readiness. As Watkins has remarked:

> "We now maintain a continual presence in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Caribbean, as well as our more traditional forward deployments to the Mediterranean and Western Pacific. Although we are not at war today, our operating tempo has been about 20 percent higher than during the Vietnam War."[7]

What is interesting is the manner in which the build-up of US force projection capabilities has gone hand in hand with an increasingly aggressive maritime strategy and a belief on the part of the Reagan Administration that US interests, especially in South West Asia and the Caribbean, are directly at risk.

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[6] Ibid.

[7] Watkins, Op cit.

The US Force Projection Expansion

In the context of force projection, there are six main areas of interest: carrier battle groups, the re-introduction of battleships, amphibious forces, logistic support, rapid deployment forces, and special forces. All will be described, albeit briefly, followed by a summary of Soviet and other developments and an analysis of the implications for the remainder of the decade.

1. Carrier Battle Groups. The United States has 14 operational aircraft carriers plus several in reserve. Each is available for deployment in a carrier battle group (CBG) with a range of cruiser, destroyer, frigate and submarine escorts and logistic support. No other country has comparable forces; indeed, as Table 1 shows, just three US carrier battle groups deploy more fixed-wing aircraft than all the carrier-borne forces of the remaining countries of the world.

Each CBG provides a mobile strike capability comprising interceptors, strike aircraft, electronic warfare and anti-submarine aircraft, airborne early warning and aerial re-fuelling. A protective screen of 500 mile radius is possible around the CBG and the strike aircraft can operate out to an even wider combat radius and are nuclear capable. CBGs are routinely equipped with a range of tactical nuclear weapons including land attack ordinance and anti-submarine depth bombs.

Table 1

Fixed-wing carrier-borne aircraft (May 1987)

Country	Carriers	Aircraft per Carrier+	Total Aircraft
Argentina	1	15	15
Brazil	1	8	8
France	2	29	58
India*	2	16**	32
Spain	1	5**	5
USSR	4	12**	48
UK	3	5*	15
USA*	12	80)	1200***
	2	70)	

Notes
+ Numbers likely to be higher in wartime
* Figures for late 1987
** STOVL aircraft of limited range (Harrier or Forger)
*** Excluding STOVL planes on amphibious warfare ships

The 14 US carrier battle groups, one of which is being formed during 1987, represent the most powerful form of US naval force projection. Qualitative changes and their possible expansion to 15 by 1990 enhances this capability markedly.

2. Battleship Surface Action Groups. Apart from the use of a battleship for a short period during the Vietnam War, the United States did not maintain operational battleships for a quarter of a century after the mid-1950s. This was changed with the 1981 decision to re-activate and modernize the four battleships then in reserve, as dedicated land attack platforms. The first three are now in service and the last will commission in 1988.

The ships retain their massive 16 inch main armament, but eight of the twenty secondary 5 inch guns have been replaced with 32 Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles and 16 Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The main armament enables a ship to fire nine one-ton high explosive shells over a fifteen mile range simultaneously. The New Jersey used its guns in this manner against shore targets in Lebanon, on several occasions in December 1984.

No other nation possesses such a naval bombardment potential or anything remotely approaching it. It has been recognised that the battleship re-activation programme has greatly strengthened potential fire support for marine amphibious landings.[8]

3. Amphibious Forces. With 190,000 men, the US Marine Corps

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[8] Kelley, General P.X., The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute Supplement, January 1986.

is far larger than the entire British Army and nearly an order of magnitude larger than its Soviet equivalent of 20,000. It has some 40 amphibious warfare ships of above 10,000 tons displacement, compared with 7 for all other countries. The Corps maintains its own integral air support and a wide range of specialised equipment including tactical nuclear weapons, and is deployed for combat at any one of three levels - unit, brigade or force.

The basic marine component, the Marine Amphibious Unit, is fully equipped with tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery and up to 25 medium and heavy lift helicopters. Moreover, the larger ships such as the Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships are specifically designed to allow battalion-sized troop groups to remain on board for long periods, in some comfort.

While the US Marine Corps is not being enlarged to any great extent, important qualitative changes are in progress. These include deployment of over 300 advanced AV8B Harrier jump jets, all nuclear capable, the purchase of Piranha light attack vehicles and the development of an entirely new class of amphibious assault ship, the Wasp-class, which will enter service in 1989. In the early 1990s, the deployment of large numbers of armed air-cushion vehicles will greatly extend the ability of the US Marine Corps to conduct amphibious assaults, increasing the proportion of coastlines, over which such assaults can be conducted, at least three-fold. In all, the aim is for the Corps to be able to field a complete Marine Amphibious Force and a Marine Amphibious Brigade simultaneously, in time of full-scale war.

Table 2

US Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Forces

Structure	Marine Personnel	Navy Personnel	Amphibious Shipping
Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)	2,350	156	4 - 6
Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB)	15,000	670	21 - 26
Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)	48,200	2,400	c.50

Far more important in our context of controlling the violent peace, however, is the development of permanent basing backed up by logistic prepositioning. In recent years this has involved two MAUs in the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean and one in the Mediterranean, but this routine force level is now being upgraded substantially by prepositioning and the development of integrated rapid deployment forces involving army as well as marine units.

4. Logistic Support. Unless army or marine forces are fully supplied with food, fuel, munitions and other stores, their capabilities in combat decline rapidly. United States military strategy calls for the capacity to act with force virtually anywhere in the world, often many thousands of miles from US territory or even from existing permanent deployments of US forces in, for example, Europe and South East Asia.

The US Military Sealift Command (MSC) has traditionally been the service which supplies such support, but the increasing US concern with force projection has made it necessary to transform MSC capabilities. This is being done in the 1980s in three ways. (1) Eight large fast containerships are being converted into Fast Sealift Support ships, capable of transporting most of the equipment for a complete armoured division to the Persian Gulf via the Suez Canal in two weeks.[9] (2) A temporary Near Term Prepositioning Force of up to 17 ships has been set up, based at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and also in the Mediterranean, and able to maintain a Marine Amphibious Brigade of 12,000 troops and supporting personnel, for 30 days without re-supply. (3) This force will shortly be replaced by 13 Maritime Prepositioning ships, custom-built or converted merchant ships which together

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[9] Preston, Anthony, Strategic Sealift Aims to Sustain US Military Forces, Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 April 1985.

are able to support a full Marine Amphibious Force of around 50,000 troops for 30 days.

While not widely recognised, this revolution in logistic support is probably more significant in terms of increased force projection capabilities than the expansion of the carrier battle groups or the re-activation of battleships. The new logistic policy is tailored specifically to South West Asia but can be used elsewhere. The island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, a British possession leased to the United States, is an essential component and gives the US a capability for intervention in the Middle East which was notably absent in the 1970s.

5. The Rapid Deployment Force and CENTCOM. After the traumas of the mid-1970s, Presidential Directive 18, of 1977, ordered the Department of Defense to identify existing forces which might be tasked for operations in remote areas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded in 1979 with a plan for a pool of forces from the four branches of the armed services, based in the continental United States but trained, equipped and provided with transport for action world-wide. This became the Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force, created in 1980.

Three years later, the Rapid Deployment Force was elevated to the status of an entirely new integrated military command, Central Command (CENTCOM), with responsibility for maintaining US interests in North East Africa and South West Asia.[10] By late 1984, the forces available to CENTCOM included four army divisions and one brigade, and a marine division and a brigade, a total of around 80,000 troops

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[10] Kingston, General Robert C., US Central Command, Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Summer 1985.

together with comprehensive air and sea support.[11] A key concept was rapid deployment, with elements of the army's 82nd Airborne Division being kept at a high state of readiness. Thus a complete army brigade (4,000+ men) with comprehensive air-mobile artillery and air defences became available at twenty hours notice.

CENTCOM now has some 300,000 personnel from all four services assigned to it. It comprises the US Third Army, the Ninth Air Force, three carrier battle groups and a marine amphibious force together with elements of the US Strategic Air Command and many specialised units. While most of the forces and the HQ of CENTCOM are located in the United States, the forces are trained and equipped for rapid use in the Middle East, South West Asia and Central Africa. The logistic prepositioning already described is integral to this strategy.

6. Special Forces and Tactics. One of the areas of most rapid expansion has been that of special forces. A Unified Command for Special Forces has been set up in the United States, covering units such as the Green Berets, Navy SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) forces, Air Force Special Operations Squadrons, Rangers, and Delta Force. All these groups are particularly concerned with low intensity operations, and most of their experience in recent years has been in the Third World. Special Operations Force (SOF) active duty manpower rose by 30 per cent from 1981 to 1985 to 14,900 and, together with reserves, totalled about 32,000. Planned figures for 1990 will be 20,900 and 38,400 respectively.[12]

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[11] Rogers, Paul, Rapid Deployment Forces and Third World Intervention, Paper for Development Studies Association Annual Conference, Bradford, UK, 1984.

[12] Carroll, Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN-ret.), Militarization, the Superpowers and the Third World, Paper for the Conference on Militarization in the Third World, Queen's

A wide range of new weaponry includes six submarines designed to carry mini-subs termed Swimmer Delivery Vehicles, a threefold increase in USAF specialised aircraft to support SOF activities, as well as specialised ground weapons and greatly improved communications equipment.

New technology for long-range intervention

Even with this expansion in numbers and improvements in weapons, a major drawback of third world intervention is the risk of casualties and the political consequences in terms of domestic opinion. This provides one of the motives for the development of long-range "smart" missiles, launched from ships or submarines. Particularly significant are the varieties of land-attack cruise missiles now entering the inventory. The US Navy is deploying over 4,000 cruise missiles on around 200 ships and submarines by the end of the decade, and all but 750 will be conventionally armed. A minority will be for anti-ship use, but most will be land attack missiles with ranges of up to 400 miles. The use of "scene matching" as well as inertial guidance will enable these missiles to achieve high rates of accuracy. Many will be armed with area impact munitions which will enable them to destroy "soft" and "semi-hard" targets dispersed over several acres.

It will thus be possible for a submarine patrolling 100 miles off the coast of a third world country to fire a salvo of missiles at targets up to 300 miles inland, using these missiles to destroy barracks, air-fields, guerilla concentrations and similar forces. Such an attack will be possible at no risk to the lives of US combatants. Moreover, no third world countries will be equipped with the state-of-

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University, Kingston, Ontario, January 1987.

the-art air defences required to destroy such missiles.

The Soviet Union and Other Nations

The considerable attention paid to the United States in this inventory of force projection is not meant to imply that the Soviet Union is not also a major military power. The capabilities of US force projection described above are far beyond those of any other state, but the Soviet Union is not static in this field. In keeping with its position as the world's most powerful land power, it has concentrated primarily on the means of projecting force around its periphery. Its marine forces are small compared with the United States and its amphibious warfare ships of any size are few in number. It does, however, have much larger numbers of essentially coastal amphibious warships, making localised reinforcement of its margins potentially impressive. Short-range amphibious warships and commercial ships taken up from trade provide the main means, whereas military air-lift is limited in extent.

The Soviet Navy is very powerful, second only to that of the United States, yet it remains essentially a defensive navy. For longer range force projection, the Soviet Union relies on the slow provision of forces rather than rapid deployment, and this often involves the use of surrogate forces. Merchant ships rather than amphibious warfare ships are used, but long range force projection has been aided by the availability of some major overseas bases. Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam is one of these, and has caused considerable concern to the United States. Its significance lies more in its position in relation to the increasingly important Vladivostok/Odessa sea route than to regional power projection, though this may be aided by the base.

In April 1985, the Soviet Union deployed a full-scale

carrier battle group, based on the VSTOL carrier Novorossiisk, in the Western Pacific. The nine-ship task force sailed over 6,000 miles and is believed to have been the first carrier battle group ever assembled by the Soviet Union. While this and other Soviet force projection exercises are on a small scale compared with US operations, their novelty is of some assistance to US military interests in emphasising the need for continued US expansion.

The United Kingdom and France both maintain carriers, amphibious forces and small rapid deployment forces. They are substantially smaller than those of the United States but have been expanded in recent years. Budgetary pressures make further expansion unlikely. The French force is primarily for the European theatre although an African role is possible. The British government, in the light of its success in the Falklands War, has tended to promote global military exercises, but the funding of expanded conventional forces, at the same time as the Trident ballistic missile programme is underway, is unlikely.

Discussion

This paper has examined the force projection capabilities of relevant major military powers and has concentrated on the manner in which US force projection capabilities have been greatly expanded in the 1980s. This is a reflection of the concern felt in the United States in the late 1970s about events in Iran and Afghanistan, and it forms part of the re-arming of the United States since 1980. It gives the United States an unequalled ability to intervene with great force and immediacy almost anywhere in the world.

Coupled with an increasingly offensive military posture, especially by the US Navy, these developments must lead to apprehension concerning the use of force projection in the

years to come. In recent years, the United States has become increasingly ready to use military force at an early stage in the pursuit of its perceived foreign policy interests. Actions in Lebanon, Libya and Central America, in 1984-86, are examples of this, and the frustration felt in the United States at the lack of control over international events considered hostile to US interests may make recourse to force projection increasingly likely.

It would appear that the current leadership in the Soviet Union has neither the military means nor the apparent intention to respond in kind, yet forceful action by the United States in the Middle East could certainly be a source of instability and possible conflict. The integration of force projection capabilities and tactical nuclear weapons may be the most disturbing trend, and one which is not easily reversed.

The rise of a new aggressive globalism in the United States, perhaps tempered briefly by the Irangate controversy, is curiously juxtaposed with an isolationist outlook which results in "short, sharp" military actions being the favoured means of foreign intervention. This is not entirely new, and was in evidence in the 1950s and 1960s. What <u>is</u> new is the build-up of large military forces in the 1980s which immensely enhance the US capability for action.

THE ARMS TRADE AND THE THIRD WORLD -- CHANGING PATTERNS IN THE 1980's

By Michael T. Klare

Since 1965, Third World countries have constituted the world's principal market for conventional weapons, accounting for three-fourths of the dollar value of all international arms transfers. From 1976 to 1985 alone, Third World countries ordered an estimated $306 billion worth of new weapons (in current dollars), and actually took delivery of $248 billion worth of such equipment.[1] These transfers--many of which have included sophisticated aircraft, missiles, and armored vehicles -- have resulted in a significant shift in military resources from the industrialized "North" to the underdeveloped "South". This shift has contributed to the intensity of recent conflicts and forged new configurations of power in the world.[2]

The flow of modern arms from North to South has long been of interest to political analysts, and has been the subject of several major studies.[3] As a result, many of the basic

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[1] Richard F. Grimmett, Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliers, 1978-1985, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1986, pp. 30, 36; and prior editions. (Hereinafter cited as: CRS, Trends 1978-1985.)

[2] For discussion, see: Michael T. Klare, American Arms Supermarket, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1984, esp. chaps. 5, 7, 10 and 11; Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982, Pt. 3.

[3] See, for instance: Klare, American Arms Supermarket; Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales; Philip J. Farley, Stephen S. Kaplan, William H. Lewis, Arms Across the Sea, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1978; Stephanie G. Newman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., Arms Transfers in the Modern World, New York, Praeger, 1979; Uri Ra'anan, Robert L.

parameters of this trade have become known to a wider academic and political community. It is important to recognize, however, that there have been some important changes in the character and composition of the international arms flow in recent years -- changes that are likely to become more pronounced in the years ahead.[4] In this essay, I will attempt to identify and assess these changes, particularly as they affect Third World countries.

By far the most pronounced change has been the apparent constriction of the Third World arms market. From a high of $43.6 billion in 1982, Third World orders for new arms dropped to $28.2 billion in 1983, $33.2 billion in 1984, and $29.9 billion in 1985 (in current dollars).[5] This decline has generally been attributed to adverse economic conditions and to the saturation of many nations' military inventories with arms purchased in the 1970s and early 1980s.[6] Presumably, this assessment leads to the supposition that international arms trafficking will revert to earlier patterns when these conditions no longer prevail. But deeper analysis suggests that this decline in the dollar value of Third World arms purchases reflects other important factors, and that these factors may preclude a complete return to pre-1982 delivery patterns.

Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Transfers to the Third World, Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1978; and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiskell, 1971.

[4] The author first discussed these changes in: "The State of the Trade", Journal of International Affairs, vol. 40, no. 1 (Summer 1986), pp. 1-21.

[5] CRS, Trends 1978-1985, p. 30.

[6] Michael Isikoff, "U.S. Manufacturers and Dealers are Struggling to Hold Their Market Share", The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 12 January 1987, p. 8.

To appreciate the magnitude of the current slump and the significance of these structural changes, it is useful to begin with a brief survey of the basic arms transfer patterns of the past fifteen years. In conducting this survey, I will employ the standard statistical sources covering international arms transfers: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, published annually by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the SIPRI Yearbook, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the annual report on conventional arms transfers published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the U.S. Library of Congress. Each of these sources provides useful statistics on various arms export patterns; it is important to recognize, however, that they do not employ the same accounting methods or cover the same commodities, and thus cannot be used interchangeably.[7] In assessing different patterns, therefore, I will cite those sets of figures which best illustrate a particular trend.

Prior to 1970, world military exports rarely exceeded $5 billion per year (in current dollars), and Third World countries accounted for less than half of this amount. Starting in 1972, however, the arms trade experienced a sharp upward thrust, with Third World countries generating the bulk of new orders. According to the ACDA, total world arms transfers jumped from $6.4 billion in 1971 to $36.4 billion in 1981, while imports by Third World countries rose from $1.7

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[7] For a discussion of the methodological problems associated with arms transfer data, see: Frank Blackaby and Thomas Ohlson, "Military Expenditures and the Arms Trade: Problems and Data", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 13, 1982, pp. 291-308.

billion to $29.7 billion.[8]

Accompanying this surge in arms buying by Third World countries was a corresponding increase in the sophistication of the weapons being acquired. Prior to 1972, the major suppliers generally provided their Third World clients with obsolete equipment no longer needed by their own forces, or with less capable systems intended for export only. Beginning in the early 1970s, however, one began to see major sales of modern, high performance equipment to selected Third World buyers. This shift was inaugurated in 1972, with the U.S. decision to provide the Shah of Iran with 80 ultra-sophisticated F-14 Tomcat jet fighters, and was followed in succeeding years by deliveries of late model U.S., Soviet, and French aircraft to other countries in the Middle East. As a result of these and other sales of high-tech weaponry, the inventories of many Middle Eastern states have come to resemble those of the front-line states in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[9]

Despite this increase in both the quantity and quality of arms exports, the world arms market remained the preserve of a relatively small number of major suppliers. According to the CRS, just six nations -- the United States, the Soviet Union,

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[8] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 85. (Hereinafter cited as: ACDA WME&AT 1970-79.)

[9] The growing sophistication of the arms inventories of Third World countries can be tracked by consulting the listings in successive editions of The Military Balance, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London. For discussion, see: Leslie Gelb, "The Mideast Arms Race: New Weapons, Old Fears", The New York Times, 2 January 1982; and Celeb S. Rossiter, U.S. Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Implications of Sophistication, Washington, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1982.

France, Great Britain, West Germany and Italy -- together accounted for 91 percent of all military sales to the Third World between 1973 and 1980. And even among these six, the military traffic was highly concentrated, with the two superpowers jointly supplying two-thirds of all the arms imported by Third World countries.[10]

These general trends persisted into the early 1980s, with 1982 setting a record of $43.6 billion in Third World arms orders and $33.9 billion in actual deliveries.[11] (Deliveries tend to lag behind orders, because of the long "lead times" involved in the production of modern, high-technology weapons.) Beginning in 1982-1983, however, these patterns began to change. The most dramatic shift was, of course, the steep decline in new orders for military gear. The delivery of arms has also declined, but not as sharply -- a consequence of the large backlog of weapons ordered in the late 1970s and early 1980s but not yet completed.

The principal cause of this decline, in the view of most analysts, was the worldwide economic recession of the early 1980s and the mammoth debt burden carried by many Third World countries. "This downward trend has been largely determined by economic factors," Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson wrote in the 1985 SIPRI Yearbook. "Many countries are facing budget constraints, and many countries, particularly in the Third World, are burdened by debts and can no longer allocate so

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10 Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Changing Perspectives on Arms Transfer Policy, Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 13.

11 CRS, Trends 1978-1985, p. 30.

much funding to armaments."[12] This assessment is confirmed by the fact that several of America's major arms customers, including Egypt, Morocco, the Sudan, Turkey and Zaire, have fallen behind in their payments on U.S. government-guaranteed military loans or have had to have such payments rescheduled.[13]

Another factor underlying the decline in new military orders is the apparent saturation of many Third World arms inventories. As the large quantities of sophisticated weapons ordered in the 1977-1982 period began arriving in these nations' arsenals, their military forces had to be retrained in order to operate, maintain and repair all of these new (and largely unfamiliar) systems. This process often takes several years -- particularly in those Third World countries which have not had much previous experience in deploying high-tech military gear -- and thus can reduce the demand for imported arms.[14]

These economic and institutional factors may begin to ease in the years ahead, producing a renewed demand. However, while the current slump in military orders may prove temporary, some of the changes now taking place in the weapons trade may not. Indeed, the statistical data reveal some

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12 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1985, London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1985, p. 345. (Hereinafter cited as: SIPRI Yearbook 1985.)

13 See: U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Loans: Repayment Problems Mount as Debt Increases, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1985.

14 For discussion, see: Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, "The Future of Arms Transfers: The Changing Pattern", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 16, 1985, p. 131; and Lawrence Ingrassia, "World Weapons Sales Slow, and Competition by Suppliers Heats Up", The Wall Street Journal, 30 May 1984.

important and durable shifts in the underlying structure of the international arms traffic.

To begin with, we can detect a substantial long-term decline in the relative market shares of the major arms suppliers, and a corresponding growth in sales by the second-tier suppliers -- among which are some Third World countries which have only recently begun producing for the international market.

As noted earlier, six major suppliers -- the two superpowers plus the "big four" Western European suppliers (France, Great Britain, West Germany and Italy) -- have long dominated the international trade in armaments. But while these suppliers still account for a large proportion of international sales (and will probably continue to do so for a long time to come), their total market share has been declining since the late 1970s. This shift is particularly noticeable in the CRS data on new military purchases. Whereas the six "majors" accounted for 90 percent of Third World orders in the 1970s, their total share dropped to 75 percent in 1981-1985.[15]

Accompanying this contraction in the market share of the major producers has been a shift in their relative standing vis a vis each other, and particularly between the two superpowers on the one hand and the four European suppliers on the other. Between 1973 and 1980, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly received 66 percent of all Third World arms orders while the big four Europeans received only 25 percent; in 1984, however, the Superpowers' share had dropped to 55 percent while the Europeans' share had risen to 32

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15 CRS, Trends 1978-1985, p. 30; and prior editions.

percent.[16] This shift appears to reflect more vigorous marketing efforts on the part of the Europeans, as well as efforts by some Third World buyers to diminish their military dependency on one or the other of the Superpowers by turning to European sources of supply. Between the two superpowers themselves, however, we can detect little real change in status: both have jockeyed for first place over the past few years, with neither gaining a long-term lead over the other.[17]

Perhaps the most striking phenomenon of the recent period is the steady growth in military sales by "second-tier" producers --nations which lack the extensive production capabilities of the major suppliers, but which have nonetheless carved out a significant niche in the market as suppliers of inexpensive or specialized equipment. Included in this category are Japan and Canada, along with a number of countries in Eastern and Western Europe (notably Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). Also included are a number of aggressive new suppliers in the Third World (notably Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Israel, North Korea and South Korea). Ten years ago, these Third World suppliers hardly figured in the standard statistical data on arms exports; today they loom as significant actors in the international marketplace.[18]

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16 CRS, Trends 1977-1984, p. 24, and prior editions.

17 For discussion and statistical data, see: Klare, "The State of the Trade", pp. 7-8.

18 For discussion, see: Stephanie G. Newman, "The Arms Trade and American National Interests", in Vojtech Mastny, ed., Power and Policy in Transition, Westport, Conneticut, Greenwood Press, 1984, pp. 155-158; and Jean Klein, "Arms Sales, Development, Disarmament", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 14, no. 2, 1983, pp. 157-59.

Third World Arms Suppliers

The emergence of these second-tier suppliers is clearly documented in the statistics compiled by the CRS. From 1973 to 1980, the six major suppliers accounted for 90 percent of all sales to the Third World, while the remaining 10 percent was divided among all other suppliers. From 1981 to 1984, however, the "other" category jumped to a quarter of all new orders.[19]

Unfortunately, the CRS figures do not provide a breakdown between European and non-European suppliers in the "other" category. From other sources, however, we know that arms sales by the Third World have risen dramatically in recent years. According to the ACDA, military exports by Third World suppliers grew by 543 percent between 1973 and 1983 (from $600 million to $4.05 billion, in constant 1982 dollars), while exports by the developed countries increased by only 33 percent. As a result of this surge, Third World exports represented 11 percent of all world arms transfers in 1983, compared to 2 percent in 1973.[20]

Further examination of the ACDA data suggests that much of this surge represents the efforts of a relatively small number of Third World nations to become major military suppliers. Of the $16.1 billion in arms transfers made by Third World countries in 1979-1983, some $12.4 billion, or 77 percent, were supplied by ten countries: Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the

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19 CRS, Trends 1977-1984, p. 24; and prior editions.

20 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 89. (Hereinafter cited as: ACDA, WHE&AT 1985.)

two Koreas.[21] In some cases, these sales represent the re-export of arms previously acquired from the major industrialized powers; in others, however, they represent the export of indigenously designed and produced systems. What we are seeing, in effect, is the emergence of a significant South-to-South and South-to-North arms flow.[22]

The potential of these new trade patterns was first demonstrated in the war between Iran and Iraq, which has been underway since 1980. Although both belligerents have continued to receive some arms and equipment from their traditional suppliers (France and the Soviet Union in the case of Iraq, the United States in the case of Iran), they have become highly dependent on imports from the second-tier suppliers to make up for losses in ammunition and equipment. While there are no reliable figures on the extent of these transactions, SIPRI reports that both belligerents have purchased billions of dollars worth of arms and equipment from other Third World countries, including Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Israel, the two Koreas and South Africa.[23]

The Iran-Iraq experience has drawn particular attention to Brazil, which has supplied both sides in this conflict, while increasing its sales to other countries in the Third

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21 Ibid., pp. 94-130. For profiles of the major Third World arms producers, see Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World, London and Philadelphia, Taylor & Francis, 1986, pp. 25-250.

22 For discussion, see Neuman, The Arms Trade and American National Interests, pp. 155-58. For a comprehensive register of arms exports by Third World producers, see Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World, pp. 351-60.

23 SIPRI Yearbook 1984, pp. 195-201. See also: Leslie H. Gelb, "Iran Said to Get Large-Scale Arms From Israel, Soviet and Europeans," The New York Times, 8 March 1982; and Elaine Sciolino, "Iran, in 6-Year Search for Arms, Finds World of Willing Suppliers," The New York Times, 25 November 1986.

World. By concentrating on the lower end of the technology scale, the Brazilians have found a ready overseas market for a wide variety of their military products, including the EE-9 Cascavel armored car, the EE-11 Urutu armored personnel carrier, the EMB-312 Tucano trainer plane, the EMB-110 Bandeirante light transport and the EMB-326 Xavante counterinsurgency plane.[24] A similar strategy has been pursued by Israel (which also produces a wide variety of arms and equipment for the Third World market), and is being emulated by such aspiring producers as Egypt, India, Singapore, and South Korea.[25] While these suppliers will probably continue to export most of their products to other Third World countries, a number of them have succeeded in finding buyers among the advanced industrialized nations.[26]

The emergence of Third World arms suppliers has many important implications for any assessment of the contemporary arms trade. To begin with, it has a significant impact--in obvious and not-so-obvious ways -- on the dollar value of international sales as reported in the standard statistical sources.

Because a number of the more affluent and developed nations of the Third World (i.e., those nations which have

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[24] See: the "Register of Arms Transfers" in SIPRI Yearbook 1985, pp. 389-439, and in prior editions. See also: Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World, pp. 79-104 and 352-55.

[25] For discussion, see: SIPRI Yearbook 1985, pp. 329-39; Geoffrey Aronson, "The Third World's Booming New Industry: Weapons," The Washington Post, 16 June 1985; and Brozoska and Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World, esp. pp. 35-77 and 105-231.

[26] Brazil, for instance, has sold significant numbers of its EMB-312 Tucano trainer plane to Canada and the United Kingdom. See: SIPRI Yearbook 1985, p. 376.

heretofore accounted for a substantial share of the world's arms imports) are now producing weapons themselves, it is likely that a certain segment of the world's military market has been permanently closed off to the traditional suppliers. Although these Third World producers continue to rely on the major industrial powers for high-performance jet aircraft and other sophisticated systems which surpass their indigenous manufacturing capabilities, they have become relatively self-sufficient in the production of small arms, artillery, trainer and counterinsurgency aircraft, and other basic items. According to SIPRI, twelve Third World countries now produce combat aircraft, thirteen produce trainers and transport aircraft, twelve produce major fighting ships, eleven produce armored vehicles of some sort, and ten produce artillery systems; in addition, a much larger number produce small arms and ammunition.[27]

In most cases, these efforts in domestic production are motivated by a desire to reduce dependency on foreign arms suppliers and to diminish hard currency transmittals. Some countries, particularly Brazil and Egypt, view the establishment of military industries as a useful mechanism for spurring the development of high-tech civilian industries; other countries, including Israel, Singapore, and South Korea, perceive the arms business as a promising vehicle for improving their international trade position. Finally, there are the so-called "pariah" countries -- notably Chile, Taiwan, and South Africa -- which have developed indigenous military industries in order to circumvent the international arms embargoes that have been imposed on them.[28]

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[27] SIPRI Yearbook 1985, pp. 331-33.

[28] For discussion, see: Klare, American Arms Supermarket, pp. 173-76; and Brozoska and Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World.

Clearly, Third World enterprises of this sort have diverted substantial funds from the overseas arms market to domestic production -- but just exactly how much has ben diverted is not especially easy to calculate. Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson of SIPRI have estimated that the total value of all major weapons produced in the Third World between 1980 and 1984 amounted to $8.5 billion (in constant 1975 dollars), but this figure excludes the small arms, ammunition, and other low-tech items which constitute the bulk of Third World military production.[29] On the other hand, many of these enterprises have been undertaken for nationalistic or developmental reasons (i.e., to spur the growth of modern industrial enterprises), and so we cannot be certain that all of that $8.5 billion would actually have been spent on imported arms in the absence of these domestic programmes. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that at least some of the decline in North-to-South arms trade that has occurred since 1983 can be attributed to rising military production in the Third World.

There is, however, another side to this equation that we must consider. Despite their quest for self-sufficiency, most Third World producers are generally dependent to a greater or lesser degree on imports of technology -- in the form of blueprints, technical assistance, specialized machinery and parts, and so forth -- from the major industrial powers. Indeed, many of the major weapons produced in Third World arms factories incorporate components or sub-systems that have been acquired from the older industrial powers. Most of the combat planes produced in the Third World, for example, are powered

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[29] Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World, p.8.

by jet engines manufactured in Europe or the United States.[30] As a result, "the Third World remains heavily dependent on the developed countries," as Stephanie Neuman observed in 1984, even among those countries with indigenous arms industries. "The more complex components are often beyond prevailing [Third World] technical skill levels or prove to be uneconomical to produce domestically." As a result, "natural resources, production equipment, designers, technicians, and sometimes managers and labor are provided from abroad."[31]

This dependency on imported skills and technology has become a significant -- if hard to measure -- factor in the global military trade. For the most part, sales of technical data, blueprints, production equipment and raw materials are not incorporated into the statistical data compiled by SIPRI, the CRS, and the ACDA. These sources also tend to exclude data on the export of kits for the repair, modification and modernization of imported weapons already in the inventories of Third World countries. While no one yet has attempted to put a dollar value on all of these technology and equipment flows, there is no doubt that they are compensating to some degree for the decline in exports of finished military goods. As noted by SIPRI, there is "an increasing flow to recipient countries of weapons-related items, such as spare parts, components, upgrading and modification kits, and so on. These items are imported instead of ready weapons systems and are omitted from SIPRI's and most other estimates of the size of the global arms trade."[32]

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30 See: SIPRI Yearbook 1985, pp. 336-41; and Klare, American Arms Supermarket, pp. 175-76.

31 Neuman, The Arms Trade and American National Interest, p. 162.

32 SIPRI Yearbook 1985, p. 345.

Despite this omission, and the relative scarcity of data on military exports by Third World countries, it is clear that these activities have come to play an important -- and durable -- role in the international arms traffic. While it is obvious that the traditional suppliers are not likely to lose their dominant positions, at least in the short run, it is also obvious that Third World producers have become significant actors in the arms market and are likely to provide vigorous competition for the established suppliers in the years ahead. Whether this trend will provide Third World producers with significant economic benefits is, however, open to question. While the establishment of a domestic arms industry may generate considerable export earnings, it also requires a very substantial level of investment (both of capital and of skilled personnel) and can result, as we have seen, in continued dependence on the major industrial powers for specialized technical products and services.

Lessons From War

There is another aspect of the current arms traffic that is inadequately expressed in the standard reference data: the growing emphasis being placed by many Third World buyers on procurement of small arms, ammunition, supply vehicles, communications gear, and other low-tech systems of little glamour.

In the boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s, many Third World countries made significant purchases of high-performance jet fighters, guided missiles, and armored vehicles. These were the "big ticket" items whose sale drove up the export tallies and produced so many newspaper headlines. Since 1983, however, there have been far fewer reports of such transactions, reflecting the decline in Third World purchases of costly, high-tech weapons. But while the demand for such items has markedly declined, it also appears

evident that many Third World countries have been increasing their procurement of amunition, spare parts, helicopters, trucks, and other basic support systems. Also growing in popularity are air-defense radars (the Saudis recently awarded Boeing and other U.S. firms a $4 billion contract to build an automated air defense system known as "Peace Shield"), electronic warfare devices, and early-warning aircraft like the EC-2A Hawkeye radar patrol plane.[33]

To some extent, of course, this shift in priorities reflects the lack of cash or credit with which to buy large quantities of high-performance weapons, as well as the "saturation" factor noted earlier. But it also appears to reflect a number of other critical factors: the growing intensity of internal and regional conflicts in the Third World (conflicts which tend to be fought mostly with small arms and counterinsurgency gear, rather than with high-performance aircraft and armored vehicles); the need to replace arms and ammunition expended in the Iran-Iraq conflict and other wars of the 1980s; and, what is perhaps most significant, a degree of disenchantment regarding the combat utility of many high-tech weapons.

Although relable figures are lacking, it is increasingly apparent that the "small" wars of the 1980s -- the internal and regional conflicts in Central America, Southern Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia -- have generated a substantial market for small arms, ammunition, and other basic combat items. To support counterinsurgency operations by government forces in El Salvador, for instance, the Reagan Administration planned to spend approximately $1 billion in

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[33] On "Peace Shield," see: The New York Times, 19 May 1985. On the demand for ammunition, small arms and the like, see Wayne Biddle, "The Big Business in Arms and Add-Ons," The New York Times, 29 September 1985.

fiscal years 1984-86 alone.[34] Very large amounts are also being spent on such equipment by belligerents in Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Philippines, and other war-torn countries, and by the various sectarian militias in Lebanon.

Heavy procurements of basic combat gear are a natural concomitant of high levels of international tension and conflict. But something else is occurring here. Many of the belligerents in recent conflicts have discovered that their high-tech weapons have not always performed as well in combat as in peacetime exercises, and have consumed spare parts faster than they could be replaced in wartime. Many of these weapons were also found to require elaborate maintenance work of a sort that is not normally available in the chaos of war. As a reult, many nations have come to place more and more reliance on older, simpler, hardier weapons -- a phenomenon clearly seen in the Iran-Iraq war, where the Iranians have had to ground their F-14s for lack of specialized parts and maintenance, while relying instead on their older and less-capable F-4 Phantoms.[35] Other recent conflicts, including the Falklands war and the 1982 war in Lebanon, have also demonstrated the need for adequate logistical support and for modern electronic gear to detect, track, confuse, and disable enemy combat systems.[36]

These experiences, all of which have been the subject of much discussion in the military press, have led many Third

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[34] U.S. Department of Defense, Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Programs, FY 1986, Washington, D.C., 1985, pp. 387-89.

[35] See: William S. Lind, "Simple Tanks Would Suffice," Harper's, September 1982, pp. 22-24.

[36] For discussion, see: Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, eds., The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, vol. I, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985.

World governments to place a premium on the acquisition of basic combat systems and the large quantities of spare parts and supplies needed to operate them under the demanding conditions of protracted warfare. Similarly, many countries have chosen to upgrade existing equipment with modern guns and electronics rather than to invest in entirely new and unfamiliar systems.[37] Acquisitions of this sort are generally much less costly than the more sophisticated items favored in earlier transactions, and so heavy purchases of such hardware may not be reflected in the CRS data on the dollar value of new military purchases. Some of the electronic and support systems being acquired, moreover, are excluded from the basic statistical sources cited in this essay, thus further accounting for the apparent decline in miltary orders observed in 1983.

It is possible, of course, that many recipients will again place orders for high-tech weapons when economic conditions prove more favorable. Given the lessons learned in recent conflicts, however, it is likely that Third World buyers will approach future purchases of sophisticated combat systems with somewhat more caution and skepticism than they did in the 1972-1982 period. If there is a compelling need for such weapons, and if the funds are available, these countries are likely to go ahead and procure late-model equipment; if, however, the same mission can be performed almost as well by a less advanced model (or by an upgraded version of an existing product), they may opt for the less costly option.

Black and "Gray" Market Sales

Accompanying the trends noted above has been a

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37 For discussion, see: Gerald M. Steinberg, "Recycled Weapons," Technology Review, April 1985, pp. 28-38.

significant increase in the sale of black- and gray-market munitions to Third World buyers. Given the persistence of revolt and upheaval in the Third World, there has always been some demand for illicit supplies of firearms; today, with the protracted conflicts in Central America, Lebanon, Southern Africa and the Persian Gulf, the demand for such arms has multiplied many times over. With the U.S.-Iran-contra arms scandal of 1986-87, moreover, we now have some sense of the magnitude and significance of this clandestine trade.

Illicit arms transactions of this sort require some explanation. Black-market sales generally represent illegal sales of military hardware stolen or misappropriated from government stockpiles, and then shipped via devious and clandestine routes to their ultimate destination. Gray-market sales generally represent the transfer of "dual-use" systems (i.e., helicopters, communications systems, computers, and other products that can be used for both military and civilian purposes) to military users through legitimate export channels, usually on the pretext that they are intended for civilian rather than military use. Typically, black-market transfers are conducted by criminal bands or underground organizations operating in contravention to established government authorities, while gray-area transfers usually involve established companies that use commercial export channels -- often with the tacit approval of their governments -- to ship dual-use equipment to military users in South Africa, Libya, and other countries that are subject to international arms embargos.[38]

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[38] For background on black- and gray-market sales, see two-part series on clandestine arms exports by Joel Brinkley and Jeff Gerth in The New York Times, 25, 26 September 1985. See also: Gaylord Shaw and William C. Rempel, "Billion-Dollar Iran Arms Search Spans U.S., Globe," The Los Angeles Times, 4 August 1985; William C. Rempel and Larry Green. "London Center of Iran Arms Smuggling," The Los Angeles Times, 3

None of the established research organizations provides systematic data on illegal military shipments comparable to that provided on official government-to-government transactions. Nevertheless, it is possible to gain an awareness of the scope and magnitude of this trade from some of the more significant arms-smuggling schemes that have recently come to light in the United States. In February 1985, for instance, the Commerce Department revealed that up to 80 U.S. military helicopters, worth a total of some $2 billion, had been diverted to North Korea after being shipped to West Germany with U.S. government approval.[39] Five months later, in July 1985, seven persons -- including several U.S. Navy supply officers -- were indicted for conspiring to ship an estimated $75 million worth of F-14 aircraft parts to Iran.[40] Then, in April 1986, a retired Israeli general and sixteen other suspects were arrested for plotting to sell an estimated $2 billion worth of American aircraft, tanks and missiles to Iran.[41]

Even these few examples -- and they represent but a small fraction of the major smuggling cases exposed in recent years -- suggest that we are looking at a very significant flow of

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September 1985; and Caryle Murphy, "Papers, Testimony Shed Light on Murkey World of Arms Ring," The Washington Post, 21 August 1985.

39 The Wall Street Journal, 4 February 1985; and The Washington Post, 4 February 1985.

40 The New York Times, 15, 23 July 1985; and The Washington Post, 16 July 1985.

41 The New York Times, 2,3 August 1985; and The Washington Post, 2 August 1985.

advance military hardware.[42] Indeed, as a result of the U.S. -- Iran-contra scandal, we now know that the U.S. government has on occasion tapped into this flow in order to secure certain covert foreign policy objectives.[43] Nor is the United States the only source of black-market arms. Articles in the international press suggest that certain firms and dealers in Western Europe have also contributed to the clandestine arms traffic. Thus, there have been several recent reports of illicit West German sales to South Africa and the Middle East.[44]

For obvious reasons, it is impossible to put an exact dollar figure on the total volume of this traffic. Some analysts believe, however, that it amounts to many billions of dollars per year.[45] Much of this apparently can be attributed to purchases by Iran and Iraq, both of which reportedly are spending as much a $1 billion per month to obtain arms and

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42 The breadth and scale of this trade is suggested by "Significant Export Control Cases, January 1981 to June 1985," a list of illegal arms and technology transfer cases under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (supplied to the author by the U.S. Custom Service).

43 For discussion, see: "From Many Strands, a Tangled Web," Time, 8 December 1986, pp. 28-31; and Bob Woodward, "Behind Reagan's Iran Deal," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 1 December 1986, pp. 6-7.

44 For discussion, see: Rempel and Green, "London Center of Iran Arms Smuggling"; Paul A. Chadwell, "Illegal Arms Exports," National Defense, January 1984, pp. 13-14; Paul A. Chadwell, "Alleged Illegal Arms Exports," National Defense, April 1986, p. 8; and Herbert H. Denton, "Arms Sellers Get Rich on Gulf War," The Washington Post, 13 July 1984.

45 An estimate of $9 billion per year was provided by an unidentified government source cited by Wayne Biddle in The New York Times, 29 September 1985.

spare parts for the war.[46] Other major customers for such arms include Libya, South Africa, the sectarian militias in Lebanon, and the various guerrilla forces in Central America.[47]

Although black and gray market transactions do not approach the official arms traffic in total dollar terms--after all, a few planeloads of spare parts and ammunition cost much less than one new jet fighter -- they probably have an equal impact on political and military developments in the Third World. This is because many of the recipients of such arms are engaged in struggles to overthrow duly constituted governments (as in the case of the contras in Nicaragua and the UNITA forces in Angola), or because there are sensitive political and moral issues involved (as in the case of secret U.S. arms shipments to Iran and South Africa). Black market transfers are also helping to sustain most of the ongoing conflicts now underway in the Third World -- including the bloody fighting in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf.

The Changing Marketplace: Prospects and Consequences

These findings on technology transfers, arms stockpiling, and black-market transactions suggest that the basic data sources on international military sales may significantly misrepresent the true "state of the trade". Black-market sales of $5 to $10 billion per year, coupled with a substantial trade in arms-making technology, could -- if

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46 The $1 billion per month estimate was provided by an unidentified government source cited by Herbert H. Denton in The Washington Post, 13 July 1984.

47 On illicit U.S. sales to South Africa, see: Thomas Conrad, "South Africa Circumvents Embargo," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1986, pp. 8-13; and Michael T. Klare, "Evading the Embargo, Illicit U.S. Arms Transfers to South Africa," Journal of International Affairs, 35 (Spring/Summer 1981), pp. 15-28.

factored into the standard export tallies -- eliminate much of the statistical decline in Third World military imports observed since 1983. While the accurate measurement of such supplementary transactions is probably beyond the capacity of researchers operating outside the intelligence community, it is obvious that more analytical attention needs to be addressed to these phenomena.

This shift in trading patterns is producing a significant and permanent restructuring of the international arms traffic. In all probability, we will be seeing fewer of the large, multi-billion dollar transfers of high-performance aircraft and missiles from North to South that were so common in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Instead, we are likely to see a larger trade in infantry weapons, electronic and communications gear, and combat-support equipment of all sorts. The countries supplying these weapons, moreover, will be a more diverse group of First, Second, and Third World producers, as well as a very active crew of black-market suppliers.[48]

This restructuring of the market has many important repercussions, some of which are only just beginning to be understood. One of the more obvious consequences is a sharp increase in the intensity of supply-side competition. The major producers are placing far more emphasis on marketing and advertising, and are vigorously courting potential Third World buyers. There has also been an increase in the number and frequency of military trade fairs (or "arms bazaars", as they are sometimes called), with more and more companies renting

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[48] For discussion, see: Biddle, "The Big Business in Arms and Add-Ons"; Brzoska and Ohlson, The Future of Arms Transfers, pp. 132-33; and Neuman, The Arms Trade and American National Interest, pp. 157-58.

exhibit space at such events.[49] Even if the demand for high-performance arms expands in the late 1980s, this competitive climate is not likely to recede much because of all the new suppliers that are now entering the marketplace.

With the increase in competition, many of the restrictions on arms exports once imposed by some Western European governments have been significantly diluted. Thus France, which played down the military side of its aerospace trade when Socialist President Francois Mitterrand took office in 1981, has since lifted its restrictions on military sales to all countries save Chile and South Africa.[50] Similarly, West Germany, which previously maintained tight controls on the sale of military gear to Third World combat zones, significantly relaxed its export controls in 1982.[51] And despite considerable domestic opposition Britain has relaxed its restrictions on military sales to Chile and other countries cited for human rights violations.[52]

Increased competition among the suppliers has also had an effect on recipient behavior in the international marketplace. As noted by Brzoska and Ohlson in the 1985 SIPRI Yearbook, "Today the arms market is a buyers' market," endowing recipients with greater leverage when negotiating terms for new purchases. This leverage has been used in several

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49 On the increase in "arms bazaars," see: SIPRI Yearbook 1984, pp. 205-206. See also: Ingrassia, "World Weapons Sales Slow"; and Rick Atkinson and Fred Hiatt, "Arms Merchants' Shrinking Market," The Washington Post, 23 June 1985.

50 Klein, Arms Sales, Development, Disarmament, p. 160; and Roger Ricklefs, "France, a Big Exporter of Weapons, is Hurt by a Deline in Volume," The Wall Street Journal, 20 July 1984.

51 Klein, Arms Sales, Development, Disarmament, p. 161.

52 SIPRI Yearbook 1984, pp. 188-90.

significant ways: to secure concessions in price and credit terms; to obtain "offset" agreements (whereby the seller agrees to purchase a certain amount of goods in the recipient country, or to help market that country's products in overseas market); and to gain access to advanced military production technologies (for use in developing domestic arms projects).[53]

Given the enormous debt burden carried by many Third World countries, it is hardly surprising that credit allowances of various sorts have figured in recent arms transactions. Nations that previously were obliged to pay cash for their purchases, or to borrow the funds at regular market rates, are now able to buy on long-term credit--often at concessionary interest rates.[54] With offsets, the supplier agrees to purchase a certain quantity of goods in the recipient country and market them elsewhere, or to otherwise contribute to industrial development in that country. And while the traditional suppliers are understandably reluctant to enter into such agreements, they are finding it harder and harder to conclude a major sale without agreeing to some type of offset.[55]

One of the most common forms of offset is the transfer of military technology from supplier to recipient. Specifically, the buyer may insist that the weapon in question be partly manufactured or assembled in its own factories, or that it be allowed to serve as a subcontractor to the original supplier by producing certain key parts -- thereby gaining experience

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53 SIPRI Yearbook 1985, pp. 363-64.

54 Brzoska and Ohlson, The Future of Arms Transfers, p. 135.

55 For a thorough discussion of the phenomenon of this phenomenon, see: Stephanie Neuman, "Offsets in the International Arms Market," in ACDA, WME&AT 1985, pp. 34-40.

in modern production techniques. Such "co-production" arrangements now figure in most major military sales to those countries with a domestic arms industry, and are increasingly setting the pattern for sales to other Third World countries.[56]

Accompanying these features of a buyers' market is the growing tendency for recipient countries to diversify their sources of arms, rather than to depend on one or two main suppliers.

This pattern first became evident in the 1960s, when some of the major Latin American countries began buying European arms in order to signal their independence from Washington, and it has since become the pattern throughout the Third World.[57] Many nations in the Middle East, for instance, have turned increasingly to France and Great Britain for their major equipment, rather than remain in a pattern of dependence on one or another of the two superpowers (which tend to exact a higher price in terms of political subservience than do their European counterparts). Thus Saudi Arabia decided in 1985 to acquire 72 Tornado combat planes from Britain, rather than continue an uphill battle to gain U.S. Congressional approval for the purchase of additional F-15 fighters.[58] A similar pattern is evident in such countries as Libya, Algeria

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[56] For discussion, see: Klare, American Arms Supermarket, pp. 173-80; Neuman, The Arms Trade and American National Interests, pp. 164-65.

[57] On Latin American buying patterns, see: Klare, American Arms Supermarket, pp. 77-107; Luigi Einaudi, Hans Heymann, Jr. David Ronfeldt, and Caesar Sereseres, Arms Transfers to Latin America, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1973; and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Arms Sales in Latin America, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1973.

[58] The Washington Post, 10, 17, 27 September 1985.

and Iraq, which have turned to French and Italian suppliers rather than maintain a sole-source relationship with the Soviet Union.[59]

The process of diversification has been aided, of course, by the entry of more and more suppliers into the world arms market. Although production of supersonic aircraft and other high-tech systems is still limited to a handful of countries, many other weapons are available from a wide range of suppliers.[60] Because the newer suppliers tend to offer more attractive economic terms (i.e., lower prices, easier credit terms or superior offsets) than the traditional suppliers, it is not surprising that many Third World buyers are increasingly turning to the secondary suppliers--including other Third World Countries--when acquiring less sophisticated equipment.[61] The proliferation of suppliers has also made it easier for countries exposed to some form of arms embargo to fulfill their weapons requirements. As noted earlier, Iran and Iraq have both turned to Third World suppliers to obtain arms and ammunition for their continuing conflict, and this has also been the case for such countries as South Africa, Chile, and Taiwan.

The proliferation of arms suppliers, the diversification of acquisition patterns, and the breakdown of established trading patterns are likely to have a significant impact on

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59 SIPRI Yearbook 1984, p. 188.

60 For a register of the indigenous and licensed production of arms in Third World countries, see: Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World, pp. 305-50.

61 Customers for Brazilian arms, for instance, have included Algeria, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. See: SIPRI Yearbook 1985, pp. 389-423.

future political and military developments in the Third World.

To begin with, it is apparent that the strong patron-client relationships forged between the major arms suppliers and their Third World customers, in the 1960s and 1970s, are progressively loosening as recipients diversify their sources of supply. Until fairly recently, most Third World countries tended to obtain the bulk of their miltary equipment from a single supplier -- usually one or the other of the two superpowers. Today, most Third World countries buy from a variety of sources, and some, as we have seen, have established their own indigenous arms industries. In many cases, this has resulted in a greater degree of political automony on the part of the Third World countries -- often at the expense of the two superpowers, which have both suffered dramatic political reversals in recent years (the United States in Iran, Nicaragua, and the Sudan; the Soviet Union in Egypt, Somalia, and Iraq).[62]

This same process of diversification has also made it easier for belligerents to obtain the arms and equipment needed to sustain high levels of combat -- even in the face of an embargo imposed by the major suppliers. This is perhaps the outstanding lesson of the Iran-Iraq conflict, which has continued for seven gruelling years despite the nominal efforts of both superpowers to limit arms transfers to the protagonists. A similar pattern can be seen, moreover, in the continuing struggles in Central America, Lebanon and Southern Africa.

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62 For discussion, see: Klare, American Arms Supermarket, Chaps. 6, 7 and 10. On the Soviet experience with arms sales, see: Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, pp. 73-82; and Rajan Menon, Soviet Power and the Third World, New Haven, Yale University Press, Chap. 4.

The growing emphasis on purchases of basic combat gear, spare parts, and ammunition is also ominous in this regard. While many of the high-performance jets acquired in the 1970s are likely to spend much of their time on the ground in any future conflict (because of the difficulties of maintaining them under wartime conditions), the large quantities of less capable systems now being stockpiled are not likely to sit idle. Indeed, the whole emphasis on such hardware suggests conscious planning for sustained, high-intensity conflict on the part of many Third World governments. This is particularly evident in the Middle East, where both Israel and Syria have stockpiled vast quantities of combat gear in anticipation of another conflict in Lebanon.[63]

It would be foolish to argue that increased arms transfers automatically increase the risk of war -- too many factors go into the war/no-war decision, and it is almost impossible to calculate the relative importance of any single factor. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the widespread availability of modern arms has made it easier for potential belligerents to choose the military, rather than the diplomatic, option when seeking to resolve local disputes. Stark examples of this phenomenon include Argentina's 1982 decision to occupy the Falklands, Israel's 1982 decision to invade southern Lebanon, Libya's 1983 decision to intervene in the Chadian civil war, and, most notably, Iraq's 1980 decision to invade Iran.

Arms transfers have also contributed to the destructive intensity of many recent conflicts, particularly those fought with large numbers of modern munitions. The war in the Falklands, for instance, entailed relatively high levels of

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63 See: Charlotte Salkowski, "Arms Buildup, Raid on PLO Threaten Mideast," The New York Times, 2 October 1985.

destruction (12 ships sunk or damaged, 124 planes shot down) despite the limited nature of the conflict, while the 1982 conflict in Lebanon produced an estimated 50,000 casualties in just one month of fighting. This trend toward greater combat intensity is particularly worrisome because it increases the likelihood that future Third World conflicts will escalate to the point where they threaten the geostrategic interests of the United States and/or the Soviet Union, thus inviting intervention by the Superpowers and risking even higher levels of escalation.

Even in the absence of significant military activity, arms transfers contribute to instability in the Third World by consuming vast sums needed for famine relief and economic development. At a time of economic austerity and scarce credit, excessive spending on imported arms exacerbates debt problems and precludes investment in non-military development programmes. "Arms imports soak up foreign-exchange loans that could otherwise finance purchases of capital goods", Professor Lance Taylor of MIT noted in 1981. "Econometric studies suggest that each extra dollar spent on arms reduces domestic investment by 25 cents and agricultural output by 20 cents".[64] Also disturbing is the fact that African countries spent some $20.4 billion on imported arms in 1981-84[65], just at the moment when the continent's fragile agricultural infrastructure was about to come under severe strain.

All of this suggests a pressing need for fresh consideration of proposals to curb the global traffic in conventional arms. Without some international co-operation in controlling the flow of weapons, we can expect no moderation

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64 Lance Taylor, "The Costly Arms Tradè," The New York Times, 22 December 1981.

65 ACDA, WME&AT 1985, p. 43.

in the dangers described above. Unfortunately, there are few precedents for such co-operation and it is not likely to occur easily or swiftly. It is important, therefore, that we consider any preparatory work that has been done in this area.

By far the most ambitious initiative in this field was the draft agreement forged by U.S. and Soviet negotiators during the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks of 1977-1978. Although these talks did not produce a formal treaty before they were suspended by President Carter, they did produce agreement on many of the terms and proposals for such an accord -- particularly as these would relate to the control of high-tech arms transfers to overseas conflict zones.[66] It is to be hoped that this earlier effort will facilitate the adoption of new U.S.-Soviet agreements, if the two superpowers can agree to resume their negotiations on the issue.

Even if the CAT talks are resumed, however, it is obvious that the other major suppliers -- particularly France and Great Britain -- will have to be included in any future arms control arrangement if such initiatives are to have significant impact. As noted above, Western European countries now account for as much as one-third of the military trade with the Third World, and it is likely that these producers could further expand their output if they were excluded from a U.S.-Soviet accord on conventional arms transfers.

Even more important is the need for recipient co-operation in conventional arms control. So long as recipients

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66 For discussion, see: Klare, American Arms Supermarket, pp. 94-94 and 230-31; Pierre The Global Politics of Arms Sales, pp. 285-90; and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Prospects for Multilateral Arms Export Restraint, Staff Report, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979, pp. 19-24.

are willing to turn to secondary suppliers and/or their own industrial capabilities to procure arms not available from the major producers, mutual restraint by the Superpowers and the Western Europeans will have limited impact. Thus, if Third World countries are to diminish the risks posed by regional conflicts and to channel more of their funds into domestic economic development, they must work together in curbing arms imports into their areas.

While undeniably difficult to attain, such agreement among recipients does not lie entirely outside the bounds of possibility. Particularly hopeful are the recent efforts of the "Contadora" countries (Columbia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) to construct -- and then seek regional support for -- a treaty limiting arms imports into Central America.[67] Similar agreements have also been discussed in other regions of the Third World. Ultimately, such co-operative measures offer the only hope that Third World countries will be able to exercise some control over the international traffic in conventional arms.

* This essay is also published in Third World Quarterly, October 1987.

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67 For text and discussion, see: Jim Morrell, "Contadora: The Treaty on Balance," International Policy Report, June 1985, pp. 1-8.

MILITARIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Introduction

The sustained urban revolt in South Africa, since the end of 1984, has focussed international attention on the domestic problems of the apartheid state. But what is perhaps an even more dramatic situation, in the wider Southern Africa region, has enjoyed neither the same attention nor concern. This began to change, however, in 1986. South Africa's May raids against Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe - which scuttled the Eminent Persons Group initiative - Pretoria's "counter sanctions", and particularly the death, in suspicious circumstances, of Mozambique's President Samora Machel, all served to focus international concern on the extent and the devastating impact of Pretoria's undeclared war against its neighbours.

Though Angola, Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, have borne the brunt of this war, no Southern African country has escaped its effects. The entire region is today deeply militarized in ways which now both have a profound effect on all aspects of economic, political, social and cultural relations in every country, and also accentuate the extensive interdependence between them.

These are not entirely new phenomena in Southern Africa. Parts of the region have been at war since 1961, though the militarization of daily life has accelerated qualitatively and spread geographically since 1981. Yet this has been but the latest of three waves of militarization during the past century, which together brought modern Southern Africa into being, forged its present structure and fashioned its current

crisis.

Background to the crisis of the 1980s

The first period ran from 1877 to 1916. It saw the final military subjugation of both the indigenous societies and the competing white (Afrikaner and German) colonialists by the British, and the final imposition of Portuguese rule over Mozambique and Angola. Though no direct military challenge to colonialism was mounted for close to fifty years, this "first wave" of militarization established a highly coercive colonial rule. It entrenched colonial cultures of violent domination, which had deep effects on the evolving colonial societies,[1] and significantly shaped the parameters of later political struggles.

By 1916 "Southern Africa" had been moulded into a regional economic system whose main centre of wealth lay in the white settler-controlled mining and (later) manufacturing industries of South Africa itself. All ten other colonies of the region (except Angola, and, to a lesser extent, Tanzania) were locked into this regional economy primarily as suppliers of cheap labour, raw materials or transport facilities to South African capitalism. They also later became the captive, indeed the only, export markets for its industrial products. Moreover, the three so-called BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotha and Swaziland), were joined in an economic and customs union with South Africa in 1910.

The second wave of militarization began with the onset of armed struggle against colonial rule in Angola and South Africa (1961), Mozambique (1964) and Namibia and Zimbabwe

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[1] The South African government for example was headed by three generals from the unification of the four British colonies in 1910 until the defeat of General Smuts' ruling United Party in the 1948 election.

(1966). Though the resistance in South Africa was crushed by 1963, the years 1961 to 1980 saw a guerrilla-based military challenge to colonialism which eventually precipitated the collapse of Portuguese rule over Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and brought down the illegal settler regime in Zimbabwe in 1980. In the process, a severe military reverse was also inflicted on South Africa in its first invasion of Angola, August 1975 to March 1976.

Heavy human casualties apart (no figures exist), the period 1961-81 saw a militarization of political relations across the entire spectrum. These years were the high water mark of the romanticizing of armed struggle on the left (fed in part by liberation wars in Southern Africa, particularly the politics of FRELIMO in Mozambique), and the flowering of counter insurgency theories and warfare on the right. In accordance with these theories, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was thoroughly reorganised by Defence Minister P.W. Botha after 1966, and its budget rose by a staggering 4,725 percent from R40million in 1960 to R1,890 million in 1980. The establishment of a domestic armaments industry in 1964 gave birth to a huge military industrial complex, and by 1980 the state-owned Armaments Corporation was South Africa's largest industrial undertaking.[2]

P.W. Botha assumed the Premiership in 1978 in the wake of South Africa's defeat in Angola and the 1976 Soweto uprising. His government rested on a new alliance in South African

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[2] Armscor's assets stood at R1,200 million in 1980, and it employed 29,000 people, while the private and public sectors of the armaments industry employed 90,000. On budget, reorganization, and strategic theories of SADF See R. Davies, D. O'Meara & S. Dlamini The Struggle for South Africa, Vol. 1, Zed Books, London, 1984, pp. 186-92; South Africa Institute of Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, Johannesburg, 1981, pp. 58-60, and P. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians, CUP, 1984.

politics, between big business and the military. Its "Total Strategy" sought to protect the basic structure of South African interests through a realignment of political forces both in South Africa and the region. These "carrot and stick" policies offered minor concessions to those willing to co-operate with "reformed" apartheid, and overwhelming military and economic sanctions against those who did not.[3]

In the process South Africa went through a de facto military coup. The apartheid state was profoundly reorganised as the National Security Management System was systematically installed. By 1981 effective decision making power had passed out of the hands of Cabinet and Parliament to the military-dominated State Security Council (SSC). Responsible only to the Prime Minister - and after 1984 to a new executive President - the SSC has statutory responsibility for "all matters pertaining to national security" and the sole responsibility for defining such "matters". In reality everything from military spending to the price of bread falls under its purview. The SSC set up military-dominated parallel administrative structures (known as Inter-Departmental Committees) to coordinate the implementation of its Total Strategy, with Joint Management Councils (whose boundaries correspond to the district commands of the SADF) to oversee planning and administration at local and regional levels.

By 1980, the regional balance of power had shifted dramatically. Of the cordon sanitaire of white colonial states on which South Africa's regional policies and the sense of its own security had been built, only Namibia remained - and there too South African control was sorely stretched. To the

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[3] See R. Davis & D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978", Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 1975.

earlier debacle in Angola was now added the humiliating defeat of Pretoria's plans for Zimbabwe. The collapse of Pretoria's regional political hegemony was sharply confirmed in April 1980 when all nine black-ruled states - including Pretoria's easily influenced clients, Malawi and Swaziland - spurned PW Botha's "Constellation of Southern African States" (CONSAS) to form the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

This shift in regional power was accompanied by growing restiveness on the part of South Africa's black majority. The defeat first of Portuguese colonialism, and then of the settler regime in Zimbabwe, by armed liberation movements, had a profound psychological effect, reinforced in 1980 by the spectacular attacks inside South Africa of the "armed propaganda" campaign of the African National Congress (ANC). The white population was deeply shocked, and growing support for militarism was evident at all levels of South Africa society.

Thus by the beginning of 1981 the dominant regional power was already profoundly militarized; its rulers felt their basic domestic and regional interests sharply threatened. The third wave of militarization grew out of two linked sets of political battles. The first was the growing struggle for South Africa itself, the second the efforts of the states of Southern Africa to reduce their dependence on South Africa, countered by Pretoria's determination to re-impose its will on the region.

SOUTHERN AFRICA SINCE 1981: SADCC v THE TOTAL STRATEGY

SADCC: Formation and Strategies

In April 1980, the nine black-ruled states in the region formed the Southern African Development Coordination

Conference (SADCC). Declaring that "economic liberation is as vital as political freedom", they defined their collective goal as being "to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa, and to coordinate our efforts toward regional and national economic development".[4] The formation of SADCC was a sharp assertion of regional independence.

Unlike other regional economic groupings in Africa which have failed, SADCC did not set up a large centralised regional bureaucracy, nor did it attempt to subordinate widely differing national development strategies to a regional plan. Rather its members would work together pragmatically to gear "national development" to provide goods and services now coming from South Africa. The 1980 Lusaka Declaration identified the development and rehabilitation of the region's physical infrastructure, and particularly the regional transport and communications network, as being "the key to this strategy".

Six of the nine SADCC states are landlocked. Sanctions imposed against the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia meant that much of their external trade was routed through South Africa's railways and ports. Under the SADCC strategy, the railway system and three ports of Mozambique, when combined with Angola's Benguela railroad and the Tazarra line linking Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam, could serve the entire region as a first step towards regional autonomy.

The formation of SADCC coincided with the onset of the worst drought of the century, and agriculture and food

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[4] See their Lusaka Declaration published as Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation. SADCC is comprised of the six Front Line States--Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe--plus Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland.

security was defined as SADCC's second priority. SADCC's focus on industrial development, energy and training sought to reduce imports and avoid duplication of the possibility of costly development projects. SADCC states have also discussed ways of co-operating in mining, tourism and trade.

SADCC soon made progress. The proportion of Zimbabwean external trade routed through Mozambique's ports, for example, rose from 0 percent in 1979 to 53.9 percent in 1983.[5] The emphasis on the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure implied almost exclusive investment in the state sectors of the region and this inevitably relied upon international aid. Taken together, SADCC has identified a total of US$5 billion worth of projects, nearly 60 percent of which are in transport and communications. The response of foreign donors, particularly the Nordic countries and the EEC, was highly positive. By early 1986 more than US$1,100 million was pledged, with another US$1,150 million under discussion. To upgrade the roads, railways, ports and communications, one hundred and fifty investment projects were identified, at a total cost of US$2,991 million. By the end of 1986 34 percent of these funds had been secured to fully finance twenty-seven projects and partially fund another twenty-nine.[6]

The South African Response

If the formation of SADCC underlined the collapse of Pretoria's regional political hegemony, SADCC's economic strategy was a direct challenge to economic hegemony. The development of an alternative regional transport and communications network threatened South Africa with a loss of

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5 The Guardian, 20/7/1986.

6 SADCC 1985-1986 Annual Progress Report, para. 21, Appendix 1 of this report gives a detailed list and funding status breakdown of these 150 projects.

leverage (let alone foreign exchange receipts) throughout the entire region. The excess capacity and marketing expertise of Zimbabwe's relatively developed manufacturing sector, could undermine South Africa's vital export markets in Southern Africa. Any advance towards regional economic independence potentially threatened South Africa's huge balance of payments surpluses with the nine (around US$1,520 million in 1982) and the flow of cheap migrant labour to its mines and agriculture.[7]

The political consequences were unthinkable from Pretoria's point of view. First, regional economic dominance was seen as a necessary condition not just of South African capitalism, but also, more widely, of its interpretation of "western interests" in the region. Second, economic domination guaranteed South Africa's overwhelming political role in the region. Given Pretoria's belief that resistance to apartheid on the part of its own black population was externally provoked and sustained, the regime viewed its political control over the sub-continent as essential to curbing this growing resistance, particularly the military activities of the banned African National Congress (ANC). Finally, given the geopolitical and economic structure of the region, any success for the SADCC project would primarily benefit its four most radical members, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. This was bound to radicalise SADCC as a grouping. More seriously it might mean that socialism would be seen by South Africa's black population to be working and thus present a viable alternative to apartheid. SADCC could not be allowed to succeed.

Extensive studies by the Institute of Strategic Studies at

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[7] Close to 500,000 "legal" migrants in 1982 and at least that number of "illegals".

Pretoria University, after 1979, were crucial to defining the regional objectives of the Botha Regime and the options open to it.[8] By January 1981 the "Constructive Engagement" policies of the new Reagan Administration in the United States sought to "reintegrate South Africa in the network of Western security interests".[9] From mid 1981, South Africa began a systematic economic and military assault against its neighbours, with the more than tacit support of the United States.

The Total Strategy defined three central objectives. The first was to oblige regional states to expel the ANC from all neighbouring countries. The second, sought to reinforce South African economic dominance and undermine SADCC, while the third asserted its claim to be the "regional power" with "legitimate interests" acknowledged not just regionally, but internationally.

All regional states were threatened with military and economic coercion (termed "disincentive levers" by the regime), while those willing to co-operate were offered various economic "incentives". This variable mixture of carrot and stick tactics was applied differentially to the various states. It sought to "change political behaviour rather than political structures".

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[8] ISSUP was the regime's key think tank, and the Chief of the South African Defence Force sits on its board. The ISSUP Strategic Reivew 1980-1983 focussed heavily on this question. One "commissioned" paper in early 1981 is a virtual blueprint for the policies which were followed: Deon Geldenhuys, "Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relationships for the Republic of South Africa", Ibid, January 1981. See also his "The Destabilisation Controversy" Politikon, Vol. 9, No. 2, December 1982.

[9] For an extensive analysis of changing US policies towards the region, see William Minter, King Solomon's Mines Revisited, 1986.

The methods used included raids by the South African army and airforce, the attempted assassination of two heads of governments, the cultivation and direction of dissident groups, disruption of oil supplies and economic blockades, and attacks on SADCC railway links and ports. The heaviest burden fell on Angola and Mozambique. The southern third of Angola was under virtual full time South African military occupation, and extensive logistical and strategic support was given to the UNITA dissidents. In Mozambique, South Africa equipped, trained, supplied and directed the Mozambiquan National Resistance (MNR) dissident group in a terrorist campaign against the population. Three broad types of target were identified: road and rail transport; the production and distribution of food; and social services.

South African destabilisation of the region since 1981 has gone through four broad phases. These events have been widely described, and are only summarised here.[10] The first phase ended in March 1984 when three years of this "undeclared war" obliged Mozambique to conclude a "Non-Agression" Pact with South Africa, known as the Nkomati Accord. Mozambique undertook to reduce the ANC presence to a miniscule, tightly policed and purely diplomatic mission, while South Africa pledged to end its support for the MNR and increase economic assistance to Mozambique.

Nkomati ushered in the second and more ambitious phase of destabilisation. Pretoria now sought to oversee a political settlement between FRELIMO and the MNR in Mozambique, and to put pressure on Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe to accept even

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10 See Davies & O'Meara 1985 op cit, and the two full length studies J. Hanlon Beggar Your Neighbours, CIIR, London 1986 and P. Johnson & D. Martin (ed) Destructive Engagement, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986.

more stringent security agreements. In the event, however, South Africa simply did not deliver its side of the agreement, and the destabilisation of Mozambique intensified sharply. Following the capture by the Mozambican army of compromising documents, at the main MNR base in Mozambique, in September 1985, Pretoria admitted to "technical violations" of the Nkomati Accord. These included building an airstrip at the MNR main base in Mozambique, using submarines and aircraft to ferry MNR commanders and "humanitarian" supplies into Mozambique, and secretly sending a Cabinet Minister into Mozambique to confer with MNR leaders, while South African paratroopers "secured" the area.[11]

These revelations ended all attempts to parade as "the good neighbour" in the region. They also coincided with the rapid escalation of resistance inside South Africa in 1985 - and the beginnings of sustained urban guerrilla warfare now by domestically trained guerrillas - and also with the growing international isolation of the regime and a groundswell for sanctions.

By the end of 1985 a third phase of this policy of intensified destabilization sought both to strike a decisive blow against the ANC presence in the region and to undermine sanctions. The State Security Council now established an interdepartmental committee to coordinate the evasion of sanctions and plan economic warfare against the Front Line States.[12] Aid to UNITA, in Angola, was acknowledged and stepped up, and new incursions were made into Angola, Bostwana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South African hit squads killed and kidnapped ANC personnel and sympathisers in Lesotho

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11 Financial Mail, 27/9/1985. Following these admissions the Minister concerned was promoted.

12 Africa Confidential, 10/12/86.

and Swaziland, restrictions were imposed on traffic from Zimbabwe and Zambia, migrant workers from Mozambique were expelled, and a total blockade of Lesotho provoked a coup d'etat which brought down the pro-ANC Jonathan government.

As Pretoria became ever more preoccupied with undercutting sanctions, the people and ports of Mozambique were once again its principal target. By July 1986, Mozambique was able to handle only five percent of Zimbabwe external trade, down from 53.9 percent in 1983. Of the rail links to its three ports, only the antiquated Beira line and harbour remained open - now guarded by some 12,000 Zimbabwean troops. Following the imposition of Commonwealth sanctions, the influential Johannesburg Financial Mail commented:

> "There is...a real possibility that if Beira threatens to become a viable alternative, Pretoria will shift from economic warfare to the real thing, using its military power (or MNR surrogates) to disrupt the rail link and oil pipeline from Beira, on which Zimbabwe is so heavily dependent".[13]

Barely a month later, large scale attacks by the MNR from Malawi against the Zambesia and Tete provinces were a clear attempt to cut the Beira corridor. Reports spoke of "thousands" of infiltrators and of a major MNR sweep to the sea. Mozambique threatened war with Malawi, and Zambian President Kaunda and Zimbabwe leader Robert Mugabe warned that the Front Line States would impose an economic blockade unless Malawi ended support for the MNR. Tanzanian troops were also sent to Mozambique. Mozambican President Machel was killed in an air crash as he was returning from a Front Line States meeting.

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13 August 1986.

The death of Machel seems to have ushered in a fourth phase in the Southern African war, the salient features of which are discussed in the conclusion.

Costs of Destabilization

Angola has been continuously at war since 1961, Mozambique since 1964, and Namibia and Zimbabwe since 1966. While the impact of destabilization has been uneven, it has forced all the countries of Southern Africa into heavy military spending. The 1985 SADCC estimate put "extra defence spending" at US$3,060 million during 1980-1984. By the end of 1986 the figure was probably well over US$5,000 million or more than the total cost of all projected SADCC development projects. Using 1983 figures - when the war was still relatively "contained" - one estimate puts the total military spending of the 9 SADCC countries at US$2,106 million or 7.1 percent of their combined GDP. This compares with 3.5 percent for all of sub-Saharan Africa.[14]

The combined SADCC military spending in 1983 was still US$854 million less than that of South Africa. More significantly, however, the proportion of GDP consumed by military expenditure in industrialised South Africa was just over half that in the underdeveloped SADCC countries. Other comparisons are equally instructive. Military expenditure per capita in South Africa stood at $92, compared with $32 in SADCC - and $16 for all of sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa's expenditure per soldier was 2.5 times that of SADCC ($34,878:$13,765) while the SADCC figure is almost twice as high as the average for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole

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14 Doug Williams, "The Militarisation of South Africa", IDAFSA Briefing Paper, March 1987, Ottawa.

($7,415).[15]

Comparisons of the size of military establishments are more problematic, as few countries publish this information and estimates vary wildly. The most authoritative source on the South African Defence Force (SADF) puts its Standing Force in 1983 at 166,000. However when all its reserves are included, South Africa is capable of fielding a force of 613,000.[16] The SADF has 372 combat aircraft and over 100 armed helicopters. The Combined Standing Forces of the nine SADCC countries are usually estimated at between 150,000 and 170,000. But the number of trained reserves of available for these nine separate forces is nowhere near as high as South Africa's and the equipment of all SADCC armies is radically inferior to the SADF. The nine SADCC countries between them have 331 combat aircraft,[17] but while Angola's MIG-23s - and certainly the MIG-29s which Zimbabwe is reportedly soon to acquire - are equal to the SADF's Mirage F1 and the new "Cheetah" fighter developed from it, these aircraft have neither the same cadres of trained pilots nor comparable maintenance levels.

The overall military balance between South Africa and SADCC is thus hopelessly unequal. South Africa's industrial economy is increasingly strained by this heavy military commitment; business leaders have warned that the present conscription system places a heavy drain on skilled

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15 Ibid.

16 Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine, IDAF, London, 1986, p. 206. Standing Force is "the number of troops under arms at any given time under 'normal' circumstances", i.e. excluding emergency mobilisation.

17 Institute of Strategic Studies, London, October 1986.

personnel.[18] Yet very little military damage has yet been inflicted on South Africa. The huge strain on the underdeveloped SADCC economies, on the other hand, is compounded out of all comparison by the devastating damage of six years of destabilization - beginning just as many of these economies were trying to overcome the costs of years of fighting in the wars for their independence.

The human casualties of a generation of war have never been reliably measured. Close to two million people have been displaced as refugees. Almost 10 percent of the population of South Africa's illegal colony, Namibia, are either refugees or in exile. Adding estimated famine and war deaths to a UNICEF comparison of the pre-1980 and present rates of infant mortality, Joseph Hanlon estimates the number of deaths due to the destabilization of Angola and Mozambique alone between 1980 and 1986 at 735,000. This breaks down as follows:[19]

Mozambique war	50,000
Mozambique famine	100,000
Angola war and famine	50,000
Mozambique children	215,000
Angola children	320,000

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[18] All white males are required to serve two full years of National Service, and then a further two months out of every 24 for the next 12 years. They are then on a reserve list till age 55.

[19] Memo dated 16/2/1987. The children's deaths are listed separately because they are indirectly due to the war and famine in the following senses. Rates of infant mortality in these countries fell rapidly from 1975-80 as extensive immunisation and rural health programmes were introduced. After 1980 these rates escalated dramatically as health posts were systematically attacked, and health workers killed. UNICEF has calculated that without South African destabilization, infant mortality rates in Angola and Mozambique would have fallen to that of Tanzania.

TOTAL	735,000 (19)

The figures for the economic consequences are a little more precise - though they do not always tally. In 1985 SADCC estimated that "South African aggression and destabilisation had cost the 9 member countries in excess of US$10 billion" between 1980 and 1984; this was broken down as follows.[20]

Direct war damage	US$1,610 million
Extra Defence expenditure	3,060
Higher transport and energy costs	970
Lost exports & tourism	230
Smuggling	190
Refugees	660
Reduced production	800
Lost economic growth	2,000
Boycotts & embargos	260
Trading arrangements	340
TOTAL	US$10,120 million

This exceeds all the foreign aid received by these states during this period. It is also double the projected cost of all SADCC projects, and represents more than one third of all SADCC exports over the past five years. Destabilization escalated sharply in 1985 and 1986. The additional costs have been estimated at US$7 billion and US$8 billion respectively,

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20 Memorandum Presented by SADCC to the 1985 Summit of the Organisation of African Unity. SADCC terms these figures are "conservative". One authoritative source has doubled the estimate of "lost economic growth" to US$4 billion. Reginald Green & Carol B. Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC, South African & Sanctions" in Johnson & Martin Destructive Engagement, op cit.

giving a total for 1980-6 of over US $25 billion.[21]

These losses are five times the projected costs of all SADCC projects and roughly equivalent to the total 1984 GDP of the nine SADCC countries. They are even more staggering when it is remembered that six of the nine SADCC members are among the 25 poorest countries in the world, and moreover that the overwhelming bulk of these costs have been borne by just two states, Angola and Mozambique.

Official Mozambican figures show that between 1981 and 1983, 140 villages were destroyed, along with 900 rural shops, 840 schools and over 200 health posts. The total cost was estimated at $3.8 billion, or roughly twice the pre-1975 GDP. Over the next two years, and despite Mozambique's "Non-Aggression and Goodneighbourliness" Pact with South Africa, the damage was even heavier. More than 1,800 schools were closed down and 313,000 students and almost 5,000 teachers displaced. By the end of 1985 total damage was estimated at US$5 billion.[22] Prior to 1981, and even despite the heavy costs of five years of war with Rhodesia (estimated at US$556 million), Mozambique made modest, but important economic progress. Exports of cashew, cotton and coal reached record levels by 1981, and real GNP grew by 15 percent from 1977-81. However by 1985 the value of its exports fell to less than one third of the 1981 levels. The massive destruction orchestrated by South Africa has now virtually destroyed the national economy. A negative growth rate of 7 percent in 1983, was followed by one of -14 percent in 1984

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21 R. Green et al, "Children in the Front Line," UNICEF, January 1987.

22 People's Republic of Mozambique (PRM), Economic Report, Maputo 1984 and Martin & Johnson op cit, pp. 28-30; and Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique (AIM), "The Economy of Mozambique and Apartheid's Destabilising Action," Maputo, 25/10/1986.

and -20 percent in 1985. Mozambique's debt service ratio is now officially estimated at between 160 percent and 190 percent of planned 1987 export revenues.[23]

South Africa can be said to have achieved most of its aims in Mozambique. All ANC cadres have been expelled, Samora Machel is dead, FRELIMO's bold socialist project - so palpably popular even in 1983 - lies in tatters, the Mozambican state and economy virtually no longer exist, and the Mozambican people are exhausted by a generation of war and six years of famine. Mozambique is today economically more dependent than ever on South Africa. Of the total foreign exchange revenue of US$180 million in 1985, $57.5 million "originated in South Africa", either as payments for rail-port services or remitted wages of migrant workers.[24] The recent 400 percent devaluation, and the swingeing cuts announced by the Economic Recovery Programme, are a bitter testimony to how low South African aggression has reduced Mozambique. And still the country is obliged to spend the greatest part of its budget - financed by "the timely arrival of grants or credits"[25] - on defence against destabilization.

The costs to Angola have been almost as high - estimated by the Angolan government at at US$12 billion.[26] Over 50 percent of the budget is now devoted to defence. Angola has the highest number of war paraplegics per capita in Africa,

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23 PRM, Economic Recovery Programme, Maputo, 1987 and AIM, op cit, statistical appendices.

24 RPM, "Proposal on Emergency Actions in Face of the Aggression by South Africa," Maputo, October 1986.

25 RPM, Economic Recovery Programme, p. 9.

26 Speech by President dos Santos, Agencia Angola Press News Bulletin, No. 45, 8/9/1986. See also People's Republic of Angola White Paper on Acts of Aggression (1975-1982), Luanda, 1983.

thanks to the UNITA practice of mining the fields in which peasants work. But unlike Mozambique, Angola has been able to cushion these costs through oil and diamond revenues. The military balance is very different too. The Angolan defence forces are far better equipped than those of Mozambique, whose soldiers often lack uniforms, boots and ammunition, and the presence of Cuban troops guarding basic installations frees the Angolan army to fight a far more mobile war than their Mozambican counterparts. Thus while UNITA and South Africa have caused enormous damage in Angola, the country has not been brought to its knees in the same way as Mozambique.

The burden on the other SADCC countries has been heavy though not of the same order. Prolonged destabilization and finally a total blockade of Lesotho precipitated a coup in January 1986. The new government concluded a security agreement which gives Pretoria the right to vet all refugees in Lesotho, and it has been rewarded with joint development projects dangled for 20 years before its predecessor. An attempt to foment an MNR-like dissident problem in Zimbabwe seems to have been crushed,[27] but Zimbabwe is obliged to maintain a substantial military establishment and a permanent military presence along the Beira corridor at the cost of some Z$12 million a month. Defence spending now consumes 16 percent of the Zimbabwean budget, a much lower proportion than that of Angola and Mozambique, but one which has forced deep cuts in key development and social programs.[28]

At a regional level, the central prop of SADCC strategy, an alternative regional transport system centered on Mozambique, has been virtually destroyed by repeated South African and MNR attacks. The Benguela railway has likewise not

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27 See Hanlon, op. cit. and Martin & Johnson, op. cit.

28 Africa Economic Digest, May 1986; Herald 1/8/86.

functioned for years. The official SADCC report characterises the regional economy as one beset by "immense problems arising from declining investment, the erosion of its productive capacity, and security problems caused by the apartheid system in South Africa". The total debt of SADCC countries stands at US$16.6 billion, or roughly 66 percent of their combined GDP. Tanzania and Zambia have debt service ratios of over 80 percent, while that of Mozambique is between 160 percent and 190 percent.[29] SADCC's original vision of steady growth and progress towards reduced economic dependence on South Africa has been shattered.

Other costs are less amenable to quantification. The psychological trauma of a generation of war; the profound loss of hope and now prevailing apathy throughout much of the region; the social and economic consequences of the loss of precious skilled personnel (especially health and education workers) routinely selected as targets by UNITA and the MNR; these are costs which cannot be reduced to cold statistics. It is likewise difficult to measure precisely the cost of a generation of militarization of political struggles, the reduction in just six short years of all efforts to forge economic independence, and reasonable living standards for the peoples of the region, to a remorseless war for simple survival. The militarization of politics, of planning, of most economic decisions, of cultural life - indeed the subordination of much of daily living throughout large areas of Southern Africa to military contingencies - these must exact a very heavy toll in the years to come.

Conclusion

A fourth phase in the destabilization war appears to have

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29 SADCC 1985-86 Annual Progress Report, paragraphs 70 and 76; RPM "Proposal on Emergency Actions..." op. cit. p. 9.

begun in October 1986, with the death of Samora Machel in an air crash. The fact that Machel died on his return from a Front Line States strategy meeting, coupled with the accumulation of circumstantial evidence highly suggestive of Pretoria having engineered the plane crash,[30] seems to have forged a tighter determination and unity in the Front Line States. Even Malawi has now sent troops to Mozambique to guard the Ncala railway line against MNR attacks. Machel's death also seems to have finally focussed international attention on Mozambique and galvanised vastly increased international assistance, particularly for the Beira corridor region. With increased international support the major MNR invasion of 1986 has been turned back. Indian frigates now patrol the Mozambique coast, and are reported to have blocked some South African efforts to re-supply the invading forces. The groundswell of international aid to the Beira corridor may well succeed securing this crucial strategic area.

SADCC strategy has shifted to deal with the new situation and is now concentrating on two major initiatives. The first is a US$661 million Beira corridor programme to rehabilitate and upgrade the Beira railway and port as SADCC's most strategic functioning transport link. This project also envisages the creation of a zone of integrated development to regenerate much of the social fabric in the area around the corridor as a necessary bulwark against the MNR. In a new departure for SADCC projects, the Beira programme was designed to accomodate a heavy involvement by the private sector, and a Beira Corridor Corporation - headed by a former leading Rhodesian sanctions buster now working for the Mugabe government - has been established to promote this.

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30 See the press digest Facts & Reports nos. U-Z, October-December 1986.

This private sector involvement was instrumental in generating the second major SADCC initiative - a shift in strategic focus away from large state-sponsored infrastructural projects financed by Official Development Assistance towards the production of goods and services in the region and the stimulation of intra-regional trade. The new "Investment in Production" approach envisages the large scale "co-operation and involvement of the business communities both from within and outside the region".[31] Official SADCC documents make clear that this is seen as a major "New Perspective". The seventh Annual Consultative Conference, in February 1987, was the first to programme a special Workshop for Businessmen, where the new focus was discussed in detail.

The first major programme under this new focus is "The Nordic/SADCC Initiative" geared to improving the investment climate in the region; strengthening SADCC's financial, industrial and commercial institutions; improving the transfer of technology, managment expertise and intra-regional trade; and upgrading the tourism sector.[32] While it is too early to assess the outcome of the new strategy, it clearly marks a significant shift in SADCC's development. Clearly the political objectives of this new strategy are to broaden Western support for SADCC.

The various phases of the destabilization war have always been tightly linked to the international climate. The advent of "constructive engagement" lifted some of the constraints on Pretoria's use of force against its neighbours and, when coupled with the United States' frequent refusal even to condemn such aggression, provided at the very least great moral comfort. In a wider sense, in South Africa if not in

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31 SADCC Annual Report op. cit.

32 SADCC Investment In Production, Gaberone, 1987, p. 14.

Washington, the destabilization strategies Pretoria followed against Angola, and particularly Mozambique, were also seen as a model for a new form of "low intensity warfare".

The changing international climate has again marked out a new phase in the destabilization of Southern Africa. At least since the death of Samora Machel, a new international emphasis on and concern for the destabilized Southern African countries has come to the fore. For the Front Line States and SADCC this may signal a belated, though very welcome, taking sides against South African aggression. South Africa is today more isolated than ever before. However the regime has made it very clear that it will continue to use its overwhelming regional economic and military power to protect white interests from what it terms "the total onslaught". Pretoria will continue to seek to destroy the ANC in the region and punish any state which can be even remotely connected with this or that ANC incident. It will continue to seek to undermine the two main SADCC initiatives, and may well launch a stronger military attack against the Beira corridor. Its power will be used to try to undercut sanctions, shift the burden of sanctions onto its neighbours, and back up the hoary argument that sanctions hurt Southern Africa more than South Africa. Even stronger aggression can be expected in an effort to divide the Front Line States and SADCC on the sanctions issue.

The coup in Lesotho - and possibly the death of Machel - point to a new desperation in Pretoria's regional politics. In the past, destabilization was designed "to change political behaviour, rather than political structures".[33] Now it seems clear that Pretoria seeks to sow more than chaos in Southern Africa. Wherever possible it now seems intent on replacing what it sees as hostile regimes. This was relatively easily

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33 Geldenhuys 1981 op. cit.

done in Lesotho. Mozambique seems to be the next main target of this effort; how it will work out will depend to a large extent on international involvement.

Finally, it is worth noting a certain historical irony to the theme of this volume - the impact of militarism on "development". Despite the very different times in which we now live, few social scientists will forget the vigorous debates of the 1960s and 1970s over what constituted "development" or even whether "development" was a desirable concept at all. These debates were particularly sharp in universities in some of the member countries of SADCC. So devastating has been the impact of the militarization of the past six years that a little "development" in whatever sense of the word would be highly welcome in Southern Africa today.